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Abstract: This article explores how two influential 8th-century Indian philosophers, Śaṅkara and
Kamalaśı̄la, treat the threefold scheme of learning, reasoning, and meditation in their spiritual path
philosophies. They have differing institutional and ontological commitments: the former, who helped
establish Advaita Vedānta as the religious philosophy of an elite Hindu monastic tradition, affirms
an unchanging “self” (ātman) identical to the “world-essence” (brahman); the latter, who played a
significant role in the development of Buddhist monasticism in Tibet, denies both self and essence.
Yet, they share a concern with questions of truth and the means by which someone could gain access
to it, such as what, if anything, meditation contributes to knowledge and its acquisition. By exploring
their answers to this and related questions, including how discursive and conceptual practices like
learning, reasoning, and meditation could generate nonconceptual knowledge or knowledge of
the nonconceptual, this essay shows the difficulty of separating “philosophical” problems of truth
from those related to self-transformation or “spirituality,” as Michel Foucault defines the terms. It
also reassesses, as a framework for comparison, the well-known contrast between “gradual” and
“sudden” approaches to the achievement of liberating knowledge and highlights them as tensions
we still struggle to resolve today.
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1. Introduction: Truth and Self-Transformation in Comparative Perspective
For much of the intellectual history of “the West,” epistemological or “philosophical”
matters, as Michel Foucault describes them—questions about “the conditions and limits of
the subject’s access to the truth”—were bound together with what Foucault calls “spirituality” (spiritualité): “the search, the practice, the experience by which the subject operates
the transformations upon himself necessary to gain access to the truth.”1 In the opening of
his 1981–1982 lectures, Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault distinguishes between “philosophy” and “spirituality” in order to decenter modern philosophy’s central concern with
knowledge (or self-knowledge, knowing oneself), that is, with epistemology. He argues
instead for the centrality of “self-care” (souci de soi) or technologies of self-transformation
for understanding the relationship between subjectivity and truth. Having made the
distinction, however, Foucault immediately grants that “philosophical” and “spiritual”
matters were rarely, if ever, separated in Greek and Roman antiquity. For Foucault, the
turning point was what he calls “the Cartesian moment,” but before then “philosophical
thinking,” as defined above, was subsumed within “spirituality” as one of its modes of
practice. Foucault’s primary example is Gnosticism, though he says the same is true of the
Stoics, the Epicureans, the Platonists, the Neoplatonists, and in antiquity in general; his sole
exception is Aristotle.2 Scholarship has now begun to show even more that the situation in
classical India is similar. One may find exceptions—this is still a topic of debate—but as a
question of historical record there appear to be many more examples in classical India than
exceptions, just as there are in Western antiquity.
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We can still, like Foucault, try to decenter epistemological questions in order to focus
on the “spiritual techniques” of self-transformation, the “regimens of truth,” and see how
they are integrated and explained in the path philosophies that justify and enact them.
There is value in doing so, and indeed, Foucault’s notion of “spiritual” technique as a
practice or mode of self-transformation gives much needed specificity to a term often so
vague as to be virtually devoid of meaning.3 Yet, the epistemological questions do not
disappear when we shift our focus to “spiritual exercises.” Foucault may have believed that
the philosophers of antiquity were all wrong about the universality of the truths to which
their spiritual techniques ostensibly led them.4 The classical philosophers of India, like
philosophers elsewhere, were themselves deeply concerned about questions of truth, which
they tied to questions about how a person can gain access to the truth, what happens when
a person sees the truth, and so on. One aim of this essay will be to show that this is the case
by looking at how roughly contemporaneous philosophers from two different religious
traditions of India, Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism, treat a shared framework
of practice: the threefold scheme of learning (or hearing), thinking (or reasoning), and
meditative cultivation.
The threefold scheme of learning, reasoning, and meditation has been said to support
a particular type of spiritual path philosophy and epistemology. In recent years, a number
of scholars (Tillemans 2013, revised in 2016; Adam 2016; Kellner 2020) have shown how
the Indian Buddhist philosopher, Kamalaśı̄la (circa 8th century), deploys the threefold
scheme to explain a “gradualist” position on the attainment of the goal and to argue for a
“continuity” thesis between reasoning and meditation.5 The term, “gradualism,” points
here to a graduated, step-by-step process of achieving the goal of the path. It is based on
the assumption of regular causation; as Kamalaśı̄la says at the beginning of his second
Bhāvanākrama (The Stages of Cultivation): “[I]t cannot be that all-knowledge could arise
without causes . . . Therefore, if one wishes to obtain the fruit, one should practice the
appropriate causes and conditions to their full extent.”6 The “continuity” thesis holds that
there is a basic epistemological consistency among learning, reasoning, and meditation,
even for those meditative states said to be free from conceptual thought. The three practices
all reveal the same basic truth. Recent scholarship has focused on how Kamalaśı̄la explains
the transition from conceptual to nonconceptual knowledge, and whether or not he holds
that meditative cultivation adds any epistemic weight to the knowledge derived from
learning and reasoning.
Placing Kamalaśı̄la’s arguments in the context of the famous Samye debate, scholars
have typically contrasted his gradualism with the idea of “suddenness” or “spontaneity”
(the “subitist” or “all-at-once” nature) of attainment: on this latter view, the goal of the path
comes upon one abruptly or immediately, as though without any cause or effort. Here, too,
Kamalaśı̄la’s epistemic continuity thesis has been contrasted with an “independence” thesis,
connected to the “subitist” position, whereby meditation provides a new, fundamentally
different, and discontinuous insight into the nature of reality from what learning and
reasoning can provide. Importantly it is also thought to be a better, more direct, more
powerful, truly liberating insight; an insight opposed to conceptuality, one that conceptual
thought only disguises or obscures. The subitist position has often been connected to
a nondualist ontology, as expressed in the famous poem attributed to Huineng in the
Platform Sūtra:
From the beginning enlightenment has no tree,
And the bright mirror has no stand.
Buddha-nature is always pure.
Where could dust settle?
Huineng’s verse does not speak of a sudden or gradual path, per se, but expresses a
nondual perspective that undermines or at least throws into question several of the basic
assumptions upon which a gradualist path philosophy is built: causation, effort, duality.
Yet, one of the most important points made by Luis Gómez in his analysis of these issues is
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that the subitist’s nondualist ontology and rejection of the path “only makes sense in the
context of a community already committed” to the goal and the path.7 This is a point we
must continually bear in mind: Context matters, and the institutional context here for an
ostensibly epistemological debate about the implications of nondualism and the means of
knowing it—continuity or independence—gives voice to a central concern about spiritual
path theory.
Now, it may or may not be historically accurate to say that Kamalaśı̄la wrote three
treatises, each called The Stages of Cultivation (Bhāvanākrama), while living in Tibet and
engaged in an officially sanctioned debate or a series of written correspondences with representatives of a nondualist Chan Buddhist tradition from China.8 It is certainly the case that
Kamalaśı̄la was the product of a long tradition in India where related questions of epistemology, ontology, and spiritual path theory were still being debated. This becomes obvious
when we trace the broader history and context for some of the concepts and arguments on
which Kamalaśı̄la relies, such as the threefold scheme and nonconceptual meditation.9
Adam (2006, pp. 82–83) points out that the threefold scheme used by Kamalaśı̄la
throughout these treatises is not uniquely Buddhist; in fact, it is a broader Indian framework
for conceptualizing practices upon a path of self-cultivation.10 Despite its ubiquity in Indian
and Tibetan Buddhism, it is perhaps better known throughout India from its presence
in the mainstream Indian tradition of Vedānta (or Uttara-mı̄mām
. sā), its scriptural basis
therein being two nearly identical passages from the Great Forest Upanis.ad (Br.hadāran.yakaupanis.ad).11 One wonders if the threefold scheme were not imported into the Buddhist
tradition by scholar-monks (Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, circa 3rd to 4th century?) already
familiar with the similar framework in the Veda. On the other hand, we will see below
that making the link between the passages in the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad and the standard
threefold scheme as it appears in later Buddhist and Vedānta systematic thought requires
some interpretative work. Given the purported impact of Buddhist thought upon the
early Vedānta interpretive systems (Gaud.apāda and Śaṅkara, if not Bhartr.prapañca and
Man.d.anamiśra, approximately 6th to 8th century?), the direction of influence may well
have gone both ways.12 Setting aside these historical speculations, we have a situation
in which comparable Indian philosophers discuss comparable techniques as comparable
solutions to comparable problems.
It is also worth noting at the outset that comparable frameworks for conceptualizing
a series of interlinking practices can be found well beyond India. In the opening of his
1980–1981 lectures, Subjectivity and Truth, Foucault (2017, p. 32ff) identifies the typology of
mathēsis (learning, teaching), meletē (reflection, meditation, thinking), and askēsis (exercises,
ascetic practices), a framework he claims to be that of Epictetus but theorized more generally by the Stoics and implicit “in all the great arts of living” of the Hellenistic world.13
Foucault’s discussion of this framework provides the context for an introduction in those
lectures to the concept of “technologies of self” (techniques de soi): “thought out, elaborated,
systematized procedures taught to individuals in such a way that, through the management
of their own life, through the control and transformation of self by self, they can attain a
certain mode of being” (p. 35). His description of such practices fits well with the path
philosophies of classical India that concern us here. The historical proximity between
Śaṅkara (the most famous proponent of early Vedānta) and Kamalaśı̄la—the fact that both
know and discuss a similar typology of practice—lends further credibility to the project of
comparing them first as a basis for broader comparison and analysis. Since Kamalaśı̄la’s
use of the threefold scheme has been the subject of recent scholarly analysis, I will discuss
him more briefly and mainly as a foil to highlight certain resonances and tensions with
Śaṅkara and the early Vedānta tradition, which will receive the more detailed treatment
here.14 As we will see, the comparison raises difficult questions that still resonate today.
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2. Comparing Kamalaśı̄la with Śaṅkara and Early Vedānta
Typically, we rely on dualities for comparison, and the “sudden/gradual” dichotomy
has been proposed as a comparative framework in this case, too. In his groundbreaking
essay on the metaphor, THE MIND IS A MIRROR, Paul Demiéville describes Śaṅkara as
someone who “leaned toward ‘subitism’.” Demiéville asserts that for Śaṅkara:
[L]iberation . . . does not admit of any active effort on our part. It is a matter of
knowledge, not of works . . . Liberation is inherent in our ātman . . . [I]t would be
wrong to think that it could be revealed through purifying the ātman by our own
effort . . . In fact the ātman can never be the object of any activity, for all activity
directed toward an object implies a modification of that object—but the ātman is
eternally unalterable.15
Demiéville depends on Deussen (1912), and therefore gives us a fairly reliable description of
the main thrust of Śaṅkara’s nondualism and how it informs his passivism,16 but Gómez (1987,
p. 128) cautiously reminds us that “Śaṅkara . . . spawned three lines of disciples—only one of
which took a ‘leap-philosophy’ position (to borrow K. H. Potter’s terminology).”17
Modern scholarship has shown that the sudden/gradual dichotomy is more “idealtypical” than actual.18 It does not correspond in reality to a single duality, but gestures
toward a number of different but related dichotomies that may concatenate in complex
ways in particular cases. These dichotomies include the active and passive, the innate and
acquired, the expressible and inexpressible, the conceptual (savikalpa) and nonconceptual
(nirvikalpa), the dual and nondual. Gómez (1987, p. 132) concludes, “One would like
to suggest that the various polarities associated with the sudden-gradual controversies
respond somehow to one single duality, but that is not the case. Clusters of dualities,
however, do overlap.” “Sudden” and “gradual” cover a variety of tensions, which coexist
or combine in complex ways, but often are reduced and then exploited for the purposes of
polemical argumentation and identity formation. This recognition reduces or at least problematizes the usefulness of the dichotomy as a neutral typology for modern doxographical
description, but it can still be helpful as a framing hypothesis because of the productive
questions it raises for us.
Demiéville also describes Śaṅkara as a “systematizer,” and Gómez has this to say about
systems and their relation to the various dualities that comprise the sudden/gradual complex:
[R]eligious systems often are dynamic attempts to solve all of these admittedly
real and universal oppositions. The dichotomies are inherent to human thought,
not constructed by philosophers or mystics, although religious effort and ideology
often can be described as a resolution, or rather a balancing, of the tension
between the two poles. (Gómez 1987, p. 132)
The point here is that we misunderstand the nature of systematic thought and practice if
we do not also recognize and respect the intractability of the tensions that such systems
try to resolve. For instance, whether we label them subitist or gradualist, we can find a
natural tension within spiritual path philosophies that attempt somehow to account for and
describe a process of change, progression, or improvement that can seem fast at times and
slow or stagnant at others. We do well to read systematic thought and polemical debates
with such tensions in mind.
In order to put Kamalaśı̄la into conversation with Śaṅkara and early Vedānta, we can
also begin by identifying some basic assumptions shared by them. Both address the same
basic problem of human dissatisfaction, and both are concerned with the question of how
one can achieve liberation from it. That may be obvious to anyone who knows anything
about them, but the point underscores that both are working within the framework of spiritual path theory. Among the three characteristics of “spirituality” identified by Foucault
are, first, that the truth is not simply given to the subject as such, and second, that accessing
the truth requires a certain modification of the subject, a type of conversion, which can
take different forms, but means that the subject must always be “torn away” from his or
her present condition. It involves a transformation of the subject. Foucault calls it “a job”
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(un travail) and a “progressive transformation,” a movement by which “the truth comes to
him and illuminates him” (la vérité vient à lui et l’illumine).19
Both Kamalaśı̄la and Śaṅkara begin from the assumption that there is something
unstable or unfulfilling about our everyday lives—we find ourselves caught in patterns of
behavior that we believe will bring happiness, but ultimately leave us dissatisfied—but
it seems that each of us must begin the path by deciding for ourselves whether this is a
fair description of our lives. For those unconvinced by such a characterization, Śaṅkara
says, even the scriptures will not sway them.20 For those who are ready to hear it, however,
Śaṅkara and Kamalaśı̄la will identify the same basic cause of the problem and the same
basic solution. Ignorance causes our dissatisfaction, ignorance about the nature of the
world and ourselves in relation to it, and thus liberation requires replacing ignorance
with knowledge.
However, the two philosophers differ on the content of this liberating knowledge and
the means of achieving it. Śaṅkara is committed to the claim that the ātman, the self, is
identical to brahman, the essence of reality, and that the diverse world of our everyday
experience is therefore illusory; Kamalaśı̄la agrees that our everyday experience misleads
us, but he holds the view that neither ātman nor brahman ultimately exists; everything
is empty of essential reality, including human beings; we, like everything else, arise in
dependence on other things, which for him undermines the apparent solidity or reality of
our everyday world. Thus, the two philosophers agree on the illusory nature of everyday
experience, but disagree on the ontological characterization of ultimate truth. We will see
how they differ on the means of achieving such liberating knowledge when we look at
how they treat the threefold scheme.
Śaṅkara’s and Kamalaśı̄la’s basic difference regarding the content and means of
liberating knowledge, however, belies another important similarity between them. In
Vedānta and Buddhist thought, the goal may be called “liberation” (mukti, moks.a) or
“cessation” (nirvān.a); in either case, however, this goal is comprised largely by knowledge
of or insight into the true nature of reality. Common terms are yathābhūtajñāna (“knowledge
of reality as it is”), samyagjñāna (“perfect knowledge”), or samyagdarśana (“perfect seeing
or insight”); the Buddhist tradition also speaks of “seeing and knowing things as they
really are” (Pāli: yathābhūtañānadassana). We see here the application in both systems of the
widespread conceptual metaphor, KNOWING IS SEEING.21 Moreover, such knowledge or
insight has power; it is thought to be liberating. Such liberating knowledge is not merely a
state of knowing certain information about the world. Again, this attitude toward the truth
conforms to what Foucault says about spirituality. Its third characteristic for Foucault is
that knowing the truth produces certain consequences for the knowing subject beyond the
mere result of the steps taken to access it. He writes, “Truth is what illumines the subject;
truth is what gives him ‘supreme bliss’ (béatitude); truth is what gives him tranquility of
the soul.”22
Now, understanding how these Vedānta and Buddhist philosophers differ on the
nature and means of liberation requires that we engage several interrelated problems of
ontology, epistemology, and path theory. Consider the following questions about Śaṅkara
in particular: How can he be both subitist and systematizer? How can he advocate for
the spontaneity of liberation while at the same time upholding an epistemic continuity
thesis with regard to learning, reasoning, and meditation? How can he be a subitist while
discounting the importance of meditation, nonconceptual or otherwise? How does he
manage the tension between the progressive method implied by the threefold scheme and
his subitist tendencies? If he ultimately affirms that reality is inherently nondual, how
can the various means of achieving knowledge of reality, such as the threefold scheme
of learning and so on, which employ concepts rooted in difference, ever produce such
knowledge? With respect to Kamalaśı̄la, even though he can be described as a gradualist,
it is fruitful to consider how he uses the threefold scheme to argue for an epistemic
continuity thesis while at the same time incorporating nonconceptual meditation into his
path system. Such questions arise from applying the sudden/gradual dichotomy and
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the distinction between continuity and independence theses as interpretive tools in this
comparative exercise.
These are complicated questions, and a more straightforward, interpretative one could
help orient us at this point: how do Śaṅkara and Kamalaśı̄la treat the threefold scheme
in their respective works? Here is a preliminary hypothesis: the threefold scheme helps
Kamalaśı̄la articulate his gradualist system, while Śaṅkara treats it with some ambivalence.
Kamalaśı̄la uses it to explain key junctures in his system and as a descriptive framework
for the gradual path, whereas Śaṅkara accepts the authenticity of the scheme, given its
basis in his scriptural corpus, but deemphasizes its applicability or reinterprets its meaning
in some contexts.
Why this difference between them? Here again, the answer becomes more complex,
but one reason may be the differing importance each philosopher gives to meditative
practice on the spiritual path and more specifically to “nonconceptual” meditation or
knowledge (nirvikalpa-samādhi or jñāna) as a step on this path. Nonconceptual meditation
plays a crucial role in Kamalaśı̄la’s path philosophy, whereas it does not seem to be
given much, if any, importance in Śaṅkara’s writings, at least not as a stage on the path.
Arguably, for Śaṅkara, the knowledge of the nonconceptual, that is, the highest, nondual
brahman—which knowledge may itself be described as nonconceptual—may be defined
as the goal of the path, but meditation is not the primary means to such knowledge.
Śaṅkara repeatedly emphasizes that scripture is the sole means of knowing the true nature
of reality. This deemphasis on meditation and concurrent emphasis on scripture and
hermeneutics may well demonstrate Śaṅkara’s indebtedness to the orthodox Mı̄mām
. sā
tradition and his special contribution to the Vedānta tradition.23 Both these reasons for
Śaṅkara’s ambivalence also concern his reputed subitism.
We could say that Śaṅkara’s subitism makes him distrust gradualism, and while
this statement may be vague given Gómez’s comments about the value of these terms
as descriptions of actual philosophers’ positions, it is still meaningful and suggestive of
more specific claims, such as the following: His nondualist ontology, one in which the
liberated state is innate within us, shapes his epistemological position, and his epistemological position, which emphasizes the revelatory nature of scripture, makes him distrust
gradualism. His nondualist ontology also shapes his path theory, which treats knowledge
as a mental state of passive receptivity, and his emphasis on passivity and nondualism
makes him distrust causal schemes in general. At the same time, however, systematicity
breeds gradualism and a teaching system requires it. More specifically, a reliable teaching
strategy requires that there is regularity of causation, or at least a possible relation of
cause and effect between actions and consequences. Otherwise, teaching and learning
become theoretically impossible. So, Śaṅkara inherits the threefold scheme and cites it
affirmatively in certain contexts, but he also argues against its use in other contexts. At
times he defends the idea of immediate liberation, even though he also makes concessions
to gradualism—just as Gómez tells us all subitist philosophers must do at one point or
another because of the basic theoretical problems inherent in subitism.
3. The Threefold Scheme and the Epistemic Continuity Thesis
What, if anything, does meditation contribute to knowledge and its acquisition? What
is the epistemic value of meditation practice? These questions can form the basis for
comparing Kamalaśı̄la and Śaṅkara’s use of the threefold scheme, while helping to confirm
that both of them uphold an epistemic continuity thesis with regard to the relationship
among learning, reasoning, and meditation. These questions raise others, such as what
one means by knowledge, not to mention what is meant by meditation. Given that
there are numerous types of meditation, from visual to verbal, kinetic to conceptual and
possibly even nonconceptual meditation, is knowledge any easier to define? Can we
say, for instance, that knowledge is “justified, true belief,” as many 20th-century analytic
philosophers have defined it, or is it something more or even less?24 Perhaps knowledge
requires no justification, no special cognitive process, but assuming we wish to retain the

Religions 2021, 12, 1043

7 of 29

notion that knowledge requires some kind of “safety condition,” here is another way of
asking the question: Does meditation (of whatever kind) contribute anything uniquely
necessary to justifying a belief as true? Independence theorists could say “yes,” assuming
they are willing to grant that justification is possible at all; continuity theorists might say
“yes” or “no,” depending on what they mean by justification.
Kamalaśı̄la’s answer to the above questions has been a topic of recent scholarly discussion, and indeed the distinction between continuity and independence theses has arisen
from these discussions. Thus, it makes sense to begin with Kamalaśı̄la and quickly rehearse
the nature of the debate. Tillemans (2013, 2016) makes the distinction while arguing that
for Kamalaśı̄la, “yogic perception would not provide any new information from what had
been given by philosophy. Kamalaśı̄la’s yogic perception, in effect, appears to be . . . a
type of amplification or integration of the contents of philosophical thought. Philosophy
would be doing the significant epistemic work of discovering truths.”25 Here, we can understand yogic perception as another way of referring to the kind of understanding gained
in meditation practice, which is said to align with the practice of reason or what Tillemans
calls “philosophy.” Adam (2016, p. 370) takes issue with Tillemans’ characterization of
Kamalaśı̄la’s position and offers a different point of view:
While Tillemans is certainly correct in stating that meditative understanding
conforms to the conclusions reached through philosophy according to Kamalaśı̄la,
this position is not inconsistent with one that holds meditative understanding to
provide a kind of experiential verification of those conclusions.
Adam also suggests that for Kamalaśı̄la, “meditation plays an indispensable role in the
quest for liberating knowledge, contributing insights that are unattainable by studying and
thinking alone” (p. 354). Adam may well be right, but we can see multiple issues at play
here. One is the transformative efficacy of meditation, its necessity for achieving liberating
knowledge. Another is its epistemic value.
In responding to Adam, Kellner (2020, pp. 69–70) makes the distinction between
epistemic value and transformative efficacy while arguing that Adam’s claim that meditative cultivation provides “experiential corroboration” for conclusions reached through
conceptual reasoning misrepresents Kamalaśı̄la’s epistemology:
. . . there is no indication that Kamalaśı̄la would consider the certainty obtained
by reasoning to be insufficient evidence when compared to evidence provided
by perceptual awareness. Conceptual certainty is not regarded as sufficiently
strong to remove deep-seated misconceptions in the mind, but this is more like a
psychological or phenomenological insufficiency, not one of strength of evidence.
Kellner thus makes a distinction between epistemic strength and transformative efficacy,
a distinction that is perhaps less clearly made by Adam in his objections to Tillemans’
interpretation of Kamalaśı̄la’s position, but one wonders whether Kamalaśı̄la himself
draws the distinction quite so clearly. The debate raises questions about the nature of
truth and its relationship to the knowing subject in the context of spiritual path philosophy.
Can conceptual knowledge provide sufficient evidence for certainty about the world, or
does knowledge require a more intimate relationship between the knowing subject and
the object known? What justification, if any, does knowledge require? And what should
we make of the concept of a powerful, liberating knowledge? Is it the same knowledge
we gain from ordinary perception or inference? One thing is clear: when we speak about
liberating knowledge in the context of Buddhism, or Vedānta for that matter, we are not
simply referring to information about the nature of the world but to a state of knowledge
that results from and is a significant transformation of the way the knowing subject sees,
thinks about, and acts in the world.
A key passage from the first Bhāvanākrama will suffice to demonstrate Kamalaśı̄la’s
use of the threefold scheme and his adherence to the continuity thesis. It also suggests how
he seeks to integrate nonconceptual meditation into his path system:
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Regarding the three types of wisdom, that is, the wisdom arising from learning,
reasoning, and cultivation, one should first of all generate the wisdom arising
from learning, because with it one first determines the meaning of the scriptures.
After that, by means of the wisdom arising from reasoning, one understands
the meaning of the scriptures in terms of whether it is definitive or provisional.
After that, once one has thereby generated certitude, one should cultivate the real
object {true meaning} (bhūtam artham
. ) and not a false {unreal} one (abhūtam). For
otherwise perfect knowledge (samyagjñāna) would not arise, because one might
cultivate false objects, too (viparı̄tasyāpi bhāvanād), and doubt would not disappear.
And then cultivation would be entirely meaningless {useless} (vyarthaiva), like
that of the non-Buddhists. As the Blessed One [the Buddha] has said in the King
of Samādhis Scripture (Samādhirāja):
If one analyzes the factors of existence that are without self {essence}
(nairātmyadharmān),
And if, after analyzing them, one would practice cultivation,
It would be the cause of obtaining the fruit of cessation (nirvān.a).
There is no other cause that would bring peace.
Therefore, after one has analyzed with the wisdom arising from reasoning, that
is, though both logic and scripture, one should cultivate only the truly real nature
of things (bhūtam eva vastusvarūpam). And the real nature of things has been
certified by scripture and reasoning to be their absolute non-origination from the
standpoint of ultimate reality {truth} (paramārthatah.).26
In this passage, Kamalaśı̄la makes a number of points that are relevant to the current
discussion. For one thing, he outlines the threefold scheme as a logical or temporal sequence
of practices. One begins by learning the scriptures, and then proceeds by reasoning to
determine their correct meaning, before finally engaging in the practice of meditative
cultivation on the true nature of reality, which for Kamalaśı̄la is the fact that all things are
selfless: they arise in dependence on other things, and therefore from an ultimate standpoint
do not arise at all. Such a process will give rise to “perfect knowledge” (samyagjñāna),
the goal of the path. So, we have here something like an analysis of knowledge and its
acquisition, but Kamalaśı̄la gives voice to the concern that one’s meditation practice must
at some point take an “unreal” object, that is, an imaginary or conceptual object, as its
focus. For, as Kellner (2020, p. 53) says, “the yogi has to engage in reificatory practices in
order to remove reification.” This process will also involve the cultivation of nonconceptual
knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna), which Kamalaśı̄la describes as “seeing the highest reality”
(paramatattvadarśana) (Kellner 2020, p. 63).
Kamalaśı̄la shows an awareness of the epistemological problem that rival, nonBuddhist philosophers disagree on the nature of reality even while they may also advocate
for meditation practice as a means of attaining knowledge of it. Given the possibility,
the necessity even, of reifying ultimately “false” objects, meditation can lead one astray.
Kamalaśı̄la tries to allay concern by appealing to the epistemic authority of learning and
reasoning, and here he expresses the continuity thesis most clearly. He says that learning
and reasoning provide the certitude with which one can engage effectively in meditation
practice. However, he seems to equivocate insofar as he also grants that meditation practice
upon the “wrong” object will not destroy doubt, which seems to assume that meditation
practice on the “right” object does play a role in dispelling it. It is as if the certitude
provided by learning and reasoning still contains an element of uncertainty, but Kamalaśı̄la
does not say this outright. Instead, he proceeds to emphasize the epistemic authority of
scripture. He does so, one should note, by explicitly quoting it, but we should also note
that the scriptural passage itself emphasizes the transformative efficacy of meditative cultivation on the true nature of reality. Kamalaśı̄la then restates his position that scripture and
reasoning certify the true nature of reality, and that the true nature of reality is emptiness,
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the fact that things do not ultimately arise at all. Upon such a truth one should meditate,
he says, and thereby begins to articulate an answer to the difficult question of how one can
use concepts to eliminate conceptuality.27
Śaṅkara’s answer to the question of meditation’s contribution to knowledge and
its acquisition has also been a subject of scholarly debate. Many modern interpreters,
most seeming to follow later or competing Vedānta exegetical traditions, have argued that
Śaṅkara holds that meditative experience possesses special epistemic value over and above
learning the scriptures and reasoning about them; meditative experience somehow confirms
the truth of the scriptures and is their ultimate source. According to Rambachan (1991),
however, these modern interpreters have mostly misunderstood Śaṅkara’s main epistemological position that “scripture” (śruti)—the Upanis.ads or Vedānta-vākyas, “the statements of
Vedānta,” as Śaṅkara calls them—is the sole valid means of knowing brahman, and that
scripture is intrinsically valid (svatah. prāmān.ya) as a means of such knowledge. Rambachan
would argue that Śaṅkara’s answer is therefore negative: meditation has no independent
epistemic value apart from learning and reasoning. With Śaṅkara’s emphasis on scripture
as the only valid means of knowing brahman, even the “spiritual” value of meditation, that
is, its value as a method of bringing about liberation, is called into question.
We will explore these issues in more detail below, but here we will look at just a single
passage from Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad, the scriptural source
for the threefold scheme in Vedānta. This comment occurs in a brief transitional passage
that concludes the section in which the threefold scheme is first mentioned and introduces
the next section. It shows that Śaṅkara also asserts a “continuity” thesis with respect to the
relationship among learning, reasoning, and meditation. Here is the comment:
In all cases, however, since consideration through reasoning should be done
only in accordance with what is ascertained by scripture, and since meditation
should be done only in accordance with what is considered through reasoning,
that is, through what has been certified by scripture and reasoning, a specific
prescription for meditation is without purpose.28
While the remark comes in response to a hermeneutical question, the point could not be
clearer: scripture provides the epistemological basis for proper reasoning about the nature
of reality, and scripture supported by reasoning provides the epistemological basis for
meditation. Meditation by itself, and even reasoning if detached from scripture, serves
no independent purpose and therefore requires no separate prescription. Meditation
accords with scripture and reasoning. When compared to Kamalaśı̄la, Śaṅkara makes
an even stronger claim because, while Kamalaśı̄la still argues for the soteriological (or
transformative) necessity of meditation practice, here Śaṅkara even seems ambivalent
about its soteriological value. The question arises whether or how much Śaṅkara even
advocates for the threefold scheme as an accurate description of the path. Now, we will
turn to Śaṅkara and the place of the threefold scheme in early Vedānta.
4. Śaṅkara and the Threefold Scheme in the Br.hadāran.yaka-Upanis.ad
In the preface to his translation of Śaṅkara’s Upadeśasāhasrı̄, Mayeda (1979, p. xiii)
states, “In the Vedānta school there are three stages in the attainment of final release:
(a) hearing (śravan.a), (b) thinking (manana), and (c) meditation (nididhyāsana).” This neutral
statement masks a broader tension within Vedānta concerning the nature and purpose of
meditation, including “nonconceptual meditation” (nirvikalpasamādhi), and the “spiritual”
efficacy of the scriptures (śruti, “what is heard”) and their ability to liberate the person
directly. The tension can also be characterized as one between “gradual” and “immediate
liberation” (krama- and akrama-mukti). Finally, the importance of the threefold scheme in
Vedānta can be connected to the question of the epistemological status of scripture apart
from its spiritual efficacy: is scripture inherently valid as a source of knowledge of reality,
or must it be validated or confirmed by another means of knowledge, such as meditative
experience or reasoning? Vedānta philosophers, Śaṅkara among them, debated these issues
among themselves and with philosophers from rival Indian traditions.
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According to Rambachan (1991, p. 10), “[Modern] writers who argue for anubhava
[experience] as the true pramān.a [valid means of knowledge] of brahmajñāna [knowledge of
brahman] generally treat the process of knowledge in Śaṅkara as progressing through three
different phases.” The first two phases are “viewed as preliminary and intellectual. It is only
the experience which contemplation (nididhyāsana) affords that conclusively informs us
about brahman.” (Rambachan 1991, p. 14) Moreover, as Rambachan explains, such writers
often equate experience with nonconceptual meditation. Rambachan himself argues that
such a position fails to represent Śaṅkara’s own views, as expressed in his commentaries
on the principal Upanis.ads, the Bhagavadgı̄tā, and the Brahmasūtra. He instead argues that
scripture is, for Śaṅkara, “the singular and exclusive means of knowledge about brahman,”
and concludes that “it is not possible to reconcile Śaṅkara’s views with this seemingly
well-ordered system,” that is, with the threefold scheme. (Rambachan 1991, p. 97)
For his part, Mayeda (1979, p. xv), following Hacker (1949, pp. 8–9), notes that the
three stages, of hearing, thinking, and meditation, “appear to correspond to the first, second,
and third chapters, respectively, of the Prose Part” of the Upadeśasāhasrı̄, which scholars generally maintain to be a legitimate work by Śaṅkara and perhaps his only non-commentarial
work.29 The correspondence is indeed striking, but there do not appear to be any direct
references to the threefold list in the Upadeśasāhasrı̄ itself. Furthermore, as Comans (1996)
argues, chapter eighteen of the verse portion of the work can be read both as a defense
of the claim that hearing the scriptures alone can liberate a person immediately, and an
argument against the necessity of so-called “repetitive contemplation” (prasaṅkhyāna) as
a means of securing and stabilizing liberating knowledge. Advocacy for prasaṅkhyāna
meditation is traditionally associated with the Vedānta philosopher, Man.d.anamiśra, author
of the Brahmasiddhi, who may have been a contemporary of Śaṅkara and whose position
on the threefold scheme will be assessed later in the essay.30 Mayeda (1979, p. 254, note 1)
thus raises the question: if Śaṅkara rejects the necessity of prasaṅkhyāna meditation, what
should we make of the fact that the third chapter of the prose portion of the Upadeśasāhasrı̄
appears to prescribe an ostensibly similar style of meditation called “meditative rehearsal”
(parisam
. khyāna)? Clearly the place of meditation and of the threefold scheme in early
Vedānta and in Śaṅkara’s thinking in particular is a matter of some debate.
Most modern scholars who mention the threefold scheme in Vedānta point to one
(or both) of two nearly identical passages from the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad, 2.4.5 and 4.5.6,
which appear to provide a scriptural basis for the scheme.31 To get a sense for how Śaṅkara
treats the threefold scheme, we can begin with his comments on these passages. The
context for both is a dialogue between the famous sage, Yājñavalkya, and one of his two
wives, Maitreyı̄. Yājñavalkya is preparing to leave home and become an ascetic, and he
wishes to settle his affairs with his wives. The Upanis.ad tells us that, while his other wife,
Kātyayanı̄, concerned herself only with “women’s wisdom” (strı̄prajñā), Maitreyı̄ liked to
discuss “religious topics” (brahmavādinı̄). She questions Yājñavalkya about the benefits of
possessing “the whole world and its wealth” when it will not bring one immortality. She
asks him to tell her what he knows.32
Yājñavalkya agrees but instructs her to “concentrate” as he is speaking—the word
he uses is nididhyāsasva, the imperative form of the same term typically translated as
“meditation” in the threefold scheme. He then explains that “the self” (ātman) is the ultimate
reason why people value things in the world, such as one’s husband, wife, children, wealth,
power, and so forth. The self is the ultimate ground of all things, he tells her. In the key
passage that concerns us, Yājñavalkya states:
You see, Maitreyı̄—it is the self (ātmā) that one should see (draśtavyah.); it is
the self that one should hear (śrotravyah.); it is the self that one should consider
(mantavyah.); it is the self on which one should concentrate (nididhyāsitavyah.). For
by seeing the self, by hearing it, by considering it, and by knowing it (vijñānena),
all this is known (idam
. sarvam
. viditam).
It is noteworthy that Yājñavalkya actually speaks of four actions, not three, which prompts
an interpretive question about the notion of “seeing” (darśana) implied here, as well as
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how sight relates to the other three actions mentioned in the passage. If the passage speaks
of four actions, why do commentators speak of a threefold process? A look at Śaṅkara’s
commentary can help us understand how, retrospectively, commentators saw three in four.
Śaṅkara begins his commentary on this passage as follows:
Therefore [Yājñavalkya says], “you see, it is the self that should be seen;” [that
is,] it is worthy of seeing, it should be made into an object of seeing. “It should
be heard,” [that is,] previously (pūrvam) from the spiritual teacher or scripture.
Next (paścāt) “it should be considered,” [that is,] with reasoning (tarka, logic).
After that (tatah.), “it should be concentrated on,” [that is,] it should be meditated
on (dhyātavyah.) with conviction (niścayena). For in this way [the self] becomes
something seen by completing the efficient causes/practices (sādhanas) of hearing,
considering, and concentration. When these [efficient causes/practices] are
obtained as a unity, then “perfect seeing” (samyagdarśana),33 which has unity with
brahman as its object, becomes clear (prası̄dati),34 and not otherwise, such as by
hearing alone.35
While the scriptural passage only offers a list and does not make clear that seeing is meant
to be the outcome of the other three actions, the commentary interprets it to mean that
learning, reasoning, and concentration are stages of a sequential process with “perfect
seeing” or knowledge of brahman as its goal. The terms, “previously,” “next,” and “after
that,” introduce either temporal or logical stages of a sequence. The goal is apparent from
the way the commentary interprets the concept of seeing. However, the commentary
also speaks of the three practices being obtained as a unity, suggesting that they could be
understood as elements of a singular practice with the same goal. The scriptural passage
seems clear that the four actions of seeing and so forth have complete knowledge as
their result, but it is worth emphasizing the description of the goal in the commentary
as a “complete seeing.” This is a key concept in Śaṅkara’s path philosophy, equivalent
to the liberating knowledge of brahman (brahmajñāna), the goal of the path: KNOWING
IS SEEING.
The passage prompts further consideration not only about the relationship between
seeing and knowing, but also between “meditation” (or “concentration,” nididhyāsana)
and knowledge.36 One may note the subtle shift in terminology in the second sentence
of the scriptural passage whereby “knowledge” (vijñāna) replaces “concentration” (nididhyāsana).37 Again and again in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya, Śaṅkara distinguishes knowledge
from action. He argues further that meditation is a type of action, thus distinguishing
it sharply from knowledge—as we will see when we look at some key passages. What
should we make of the claim made above that “hearing alone” does not produce “perfect
seeing?” The claim would seem to support the gradualist idea that the three practices are
all necessary for the attainment of perfect seeing, but this statement seems at variance with
Śaṅkara’s claims in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya, Upadeśasāhasrı̄, and elsewhere that scripture
is the only valid means of knowing brahman, and that hearing scripture can immediately
produce such knowledge.38
It can do so, Śaṅkara tells us elsewhere, because knowledge of brahman, being our
own self-awareness, is already directly available to us. Scripture tells us something we
already know, but we know it imperfectly or incorrectly. Therefore, scripture removes our
mistaken understanding, our ignorance, which allows the truth to shine forth, like the sun
on a cloudless day. Śaṅkara says in the Upadeśasāhasrı̄: “As the sun has light as its nature, it
has neither day nor night. In like manner I have neither knowledge nor ignorance since
I have Pure Consciousness as my nature, without distinctions.”39 While metaphors like
this one express the kind of nondualist sentiment that scholars associate with “subitism,”
when we try to understand such statements within the context in Śaṅkara’s whole path
philosophy, we can see the tension therein between “sudden” and “gradual” approaches
to liberation.
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Śaṅkara concludes his comments on Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5 with a remark on
the final sentence of the scriptural passage, which speaks to relationship between the goal
of the path and the means of achieving it:
When the scripture says, “For when the self is seen, heard, considered, and
known, oh, Maitreyı̄, then all this is known (viditam
. ),” that is, it is truly known
(vijñāta), the intent (artha, object/meaning) is the destruction of that, namely,
the mental object of the belief caused by ignorance (avidyāpratyayavis.aya), which
consists in the effects of action upon the doer; and is the object of the belief that
is a superimposition of ignorance upon the self; and has as its characteristic the
castes and estates of life (varn.āśrama) and so forth; and is the cause of karma,
namely, of priestly power, royal power, and so forth; and is like the belief that a
rope is a snake.40
Recall that Maitreyı̄ had asked about the benefits of possessing “the whole world and its
wealth.” This passage asserts that “all this” (idam
. sarvam
. ), which according to Śaṅkara
refers to all dualistic appearances, is in fact only a mental object constructed by ignorance.
In fact, “all this” is identical to our nondual essence. One could interpret him to say that
the threefold process, with perfect seeing as its result, removes ignorance and enables one
to know the self. When one knows the self, one knows everything as it truly is. For there is
nothing other than the self.
Śaṅkara restates several of the same points in the short commentary on Br.hadāran.yakaupanis.ad 4.5.6, a scriptural passage nearly identical to 2.4.5. Here is his entire comment
on 4.5.6:
When Yājñavalkya says, “For, oh Maitreyı̄, when the self is seen . . . ,” he says the
following in response to the question of how the self is seen: “When it is heard,”
[that is,] previously (pūrvam
. ) from a teacher and scripture; once again (punas)
“when it is considered,” [that is,] when it is investigated (vicārite) by reasoning
(tarka), [that is,] by argumentation (upapatti)—but hearing is by scripture alone—
when it is considered by argumentation, afterwards (paścād) “when it is known”
(vijñāte), [that is,] when it is ascertained (nirdhārite) that it is so and not otherwise.
What happens (kim
. bhavati)? Yājñavalkya says, “This becomes known.” “All
this” (idam
. sarvam) means what is other than self, because nothing exists that is
different from the self.41
Again, the threefold scheme refers to a sequential process with seeing or knowing as its
outcome. We are told here that the threefold scheme explains how the self may be seen.
The comment, “but hearing is by scripture alone” (śravan.am
. tu āgamamātren.a), which seems
inserted into the middle of the passage, suggests that Śaṅkara views the practice of hearing
or learning as a specific one distinct from reasoning, an interpretation that seems confirmed
by looking at more evidence from Śaṅkara’s body of work. The commentary also highlights
what happens when the self is known, and repeats the idea that knowing the self brings
knowledge of “all this,” that is, knowledge of the nondual nature of reality.
Śaṅkara’s commentary on the scriptural passages from the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad
suggests that he accepts a gradualist path philosophy, and that the threefold scheme
provides one way of conceptualizing its structure, but it remains to be seen whether this
hypothesis is consistent with a broader survey of Śaṅkara’s works. The evidence from
the Upadeśasāhasrı̄ seems inconclusive given that the text does not explicitly refer to the
threefold scheme and includes both “gradualist” and “subitist” elements. What further
textual evidence can shed light on the place of the threefold scheme in Śaṅkara’s path
philosophy? The Brahmasūtrabhās.ya holds a preeminent place among Śaṅkara’s works.
Mayeda (1979, p. 6) calls it “the yardstick against which to measure the authenticity of
other works ascribed to him.” When we look at the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya, however, Śaṅkara’s
attitude toward gradualism and the threefold scheme appears rather more ambivalent.42
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5. The Threefold Scheme and Knowledge as Experience in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya
Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahmasūtra contains approximately ten passages that
cite one of the two key passages from the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad. These references are
given either by the opponent (pūrvapaks.in) or the authoritative voice (siddhāntin). When
Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5 is cited by the opponent, as it is on four occasions in the
Brahmasūtrabhās.ya (1.1.4, 2.1.3, 2.3.39, and 3.4.51), it is given in support of the argument
that scripture enjoins or requires certain practices, such as meditation, in order to know
brahman, and in support of the general causal relationship between the process and the goal.
This is true of the citation in the commentary on 1.1.4. It is also true of the citation in the
commentary on 2.1.3, which discusses whether or not the Upanis.ads enjoin the practice of
yoga as a means of obtaining “perfect seeing” (samyagdarśana). It is also true of the citation
in the commentary on 2.3.39, where it occurs in the midst of an argument that the ātman is
an agent and the action of meditation can bring realization of the self. The same is true of
the passage at 3.4.51, where the opponent makes the axiomatic statement: “Knowledge
has at its antecedent cause learning and so on” (śravan.ādipūrvikā hi vidyā). The opponent
draws the parallel between ritual action and its relation to the fruits of ritual and the three
practices of learning, reasoning, and meditation as the means of producing knowledge.
In these instances, Śaṅkara challenges the idea that scripture enjoins or requires
anything at all. He argues for scripture as the sole means of knowing brahman and against
the idea that meditation is necessary for achieving the goal of liberating knowledge. More
generally, he questions whether a causal relationship of any kind can be said to pertain
between the process and the goal of liberation. Liberating knowledge, he repeatedly says,
is not an action. In his response to the opponent’s argument at 3.4.51, Śaṅkara’s view of
the relationship between the means of knowledge and knowledge as its product is that the
means of knowledge remove the obstacles to knowledge; they do not produce knowledge.
This is consistent with the instances in the commentarial passages on 1.1.4 and 3.2.21 in
which the authoritative voice (siddhāntin) offers an alternative interpretation of the intent
behind Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5. The basic idea is that the passage is meant to draw
the practitioner’s attention away from objects of the world and towards the self. It is not
meant to require any actions or draw a direct relation of cause and effect between particular
actions and liberating knowledge.
When Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5 or 4.5.6 is cited by the authoritative voice, on three
occasions it is given in the context of clarifying that the object under discussion is the
highest brahman or the highest self. This is true of the commentarial passages on 1.4.19,
2.1.22, and 2.3.6. The other passages in which Śaṅkara cites Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5 in
the authoritative voice are 1.1.2 and 4.1.1-2. The first instance, at 1.1.2, refers to the passage
in order to support the idea that reasoning depends on the scriptures. The other citation
occurs at 4.1.1-2, at the beginning of a short section on the means of liberating knowledge.
This is an important section given what Śaṅkara repeatedly says about the relationship
among the means of knowledge and their relationship to knowledge of brahman, and I will
conclude the discussion of the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya by analyzing it, but we will begin with
first passage.
The first reference in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya to the key passage from Br.hadāran.yakaupanis.ad 2.4.5 is found in the commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.1.2. It is cited in support of the
complementarity of scripture and reasoning when the latter is based on the former: “Understanding brahman is accomplished by determination, through analysis, of the meaning
of the statements in the Vedānta [that is, the Upanis.ads], and not by any other valid means
of knowledge, such as inference and so on.” Then, the point is made: “Moreover, scripture
even allows for reasoning as a support, because such passages as ‘[The self] should be
heard; it should be considered . . . ’ make evident that the human intellect is an assistant
for [knowing] the self.”43 . No mention is made of meditation at all. Śaṅkara puts the
epistemological and soteriological weight firmly on scripture, with reasoning providing
support for the process of inquiry into brahman (brahmajijñāsa). The above remarks are part
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of a larger argument at the beginning of the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya justifying the śāstra, that is,
the Brahmasūtra itself, as a model for and enactment of the inquiry into brahman.
Just afterwards comes a key passage the meaning of which has been a source of debate.
Rambachan tells us that it has frequently been cited as the “proof text” that Śaṅkara claims
experience (anubhava) to be a valid means of knowing brahman. The passage reads as
follows:
Unlike in the case of the inquiry into religious duty (dharmajijñāsa), scripture and
so on are not the only valid means in the case of the inquiry into brahman. Rather
scripture and so on as well as experience (anubhava) and so on are in this case,
in accordance with their nature, valid means of knowledge (pramān.a), because
knowledge of brahman culminates in experience (anubhavāvasānatva) and because
it takes as its object a truly existent thing (bhūtavastuvis.ayatva).44
Rambachan maintains that it would not be appropriate to regard this isolated passage as
justification for the strong claim that experience must validate scripture, or that scripture is
merely an indirect means of knowing brahman. The passage is framed by comments that
scripture is, in fact, the sole means of knowing brahman. When seen in context, the abovecited passage suggests that perception, inference, and other valid means of knowledge can
play a role in supporting the inquiry into brahman alongside scripture and reasoning based
on it.
Comans (2000, p. 308) notes, however, that the passage also suggests that knowledge
of brahman is itself an experience or culminates in one. We can add that it also says
that knowledge of brahman takes as its object a “truly existent thing” (bhūtavastu). This
second point reflects the argument Śaṅkara makes elsewhere to the effect that knowledge
of brahman relies for its truth on the object itself, and not on any human agency, because
knowledge is not an action. This is an argument we will discuss when we look at the second
passage in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya that mentions the threefold scheme from Br.hadāran.yakaupanis.ad 2.4.5. However, Comans’s first point raises a separate question about the status of
knowledge of brahman. If it culminates in an experience, is this experience “conceptual” or
“nonconceptual”?
The general assumption among modern writers seems to be that Śaṅkara thinks of
knowledge of brahman as a “nondual” experience akin to “nonconceptual meditation”
(nirvikalpasamādhi). Consider the recent statement in Duerlinger et al. (2020, p. 38):
“Knowledge of the Self takes the form of an immediate intuition (anubhava) that transcends
the subject-object duality.” Rambachan (1991, p. 11ff) offers many more examples of this
interpretive stance, and against such an interpretation he says:
It is exceedingly important to note that Śaṅkara all along sees brahmajñāna [knowledge of brahman] as a mental process occurring in the mind and not transcending
it. Brahmajñāna is of the nature of an antah.karan.a vr.tti [a mental state] coinciding
with the nature of brahman and produced by its authoritative pramān.a [valid
means of knowledge], the śruti [the scriptures]. (Rambachan 1991, p. 109)
Rambachan emphasizes here that Śaṅkara sees knowledge of brahman as a state of mind,
but one may ask, if Śaṅkara says that knowledge conforms to its object, and he also says
that brahman is nondual, undifferentiated, and free from conceptualization (nirvikalpa), as he
does on several occasions in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya,45 then would not knowledge of brahman
as a mental state also be nonconceptual or at least give rise to a nonconceptual experience?46
If so, and since the scriptures, which have words as their nature, are conceptual, then
it becomes possible to ask the question: How, for Śaṅkara, do concepts give rise to a
nonconceptual experience of knowledge?
Rambachan (1991, p. 110) continues:
Śaṅkara accepts that this vr.tti [mental state], produced in the mind by the Vedāntavākyas [the statements found in the Upanis.ads], does not enjoy the status of
absolute reality (pāramārthika sattā [sic]). Its reality would be the same as the
world, the Vedas, and the antah.karan.a [the mind]. He sees no difficulty, however,
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in its capacity to negate ignorance and effect the knowledge of the absolutely real.
He willingly concedes that once brahmajñāna is effected, the absolute reality of
the Vedas is also negated. The Vedānta-vākyas, having negated from brahman all
upādhis [mistaken attributions], eventually negate themselves.
Rambachan reads Śaṅkara as saying that knowledge of brahman is a conventional, conceptual state of mind. Given this interpretation, Rambachan (1991, p. 68ff) explains how
Śaṅkara can maintain that scripture, limited as it is by its linguistic nature, can still reveal
the limitless. If we grant further that the absolutely real is itself beyond conceptuality, then
Rambachan’s explanation may begin to suggest Śaṅkara’s possible answer to the question
of how conceptual knowledge practices can give rise to knowledge of the nonconceptual.47
Comans points out a couple more passages in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya in which Śaṅkara
speaks of the knowledge of brahman producing an effect that is “present to experience”
(anubhāvārūd.ha) and “made perceptible” (pratyaks.ı̄kr.ta),48 such as the following remarks
on 3.3.32:
Because knowledge [of brahman] has a perception as its effect, it is not reasonable
to have doubt about the absence of its effect. In the case of the effects of action
(karma, i.e., ritual action), however, such as heaven and so on, which are not
present to experience, there could be a doubt as to whether the result will occur
or not, but the result of knowledge [of brahman] is present to experience, as it says
in the scriptures, “That brahman, which is direct and immediate . . . ” and “You are
that (tat tvam asi),” which instructs one that [the effect of knowledge of brahman]
is already accomplished. The statement, “You are that,” cannot be interpreted to
mean, “You will be that after you have died.” Furthermore, another scriptural
passage indicates that one will perceive the fruit of perfect seeing (samyagdarśana),
namely [the understanding] that everything is the self, precisely at the moment
of perfect seeing: “Seeing that this [self] is that [brahman], the seer, Vāmadeva,
understood, ‘I was Manu and the sun.’”49
Śaṅkara makes several important claims here. One we will discuss more below: knowledge is distinct from action. This claim recurs when he discusses the difference between
knowledge and meditation. Meditation, he will claim, is an action like ritual action. He
also says that knowledge of brahman is immediately available to experience because it
is something we already possess. One is reminded here of many passages in Śaṅkara’s
writings, including the analogy of the sun cited above from the Upadeśasāhasrı̄, which
suggest that brahman is awareness itself. Insofar as we are already aware that we are aware,
we already possess knowledge of brahman. While the scriptures may be said to remove the
apparent ignorance that makes us identify ourselves with our mind/body complex, they
cannot remove or grant us our awareness of ourselves. Rather, scripture simply enables our
awareness to know itself. Apparently, it must do more than this, however, because it also
informs us of the identity, the nonduality, of self and world. Whether this knowledge is
also directly available to experience would seem to depend on whether such an experience
of knowledge is conceptual or nonconceptual.
6. Śaṅkara on Meditation and Its Difference from Knowledge
The second reference in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya to Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5 is made
by the opponent in the commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.1.4. Śaṅkara’s opponent argues that
the scriptures enjoin certain actions like hearing, reasoning, and meditation as the means
by which one achieves the goal of knowing brahman. So, for the opponent, scripture would
be a valid means of knowing brahman only insofar as it prescribes certain actions that result
in such knowledge.50 Śaṅkara rejects this argument, arguing instead that scripture is the
only valid source of knowing brahman, and furthermore that scripture only makes brahman
known. It does not prescribe any action, because knowledge of brahman cannot be an
action. If liberating knowledge were based on an action, Śaṅkara argues, then its object,
brahman, would be subject to change, but brahman is not an object, properly speaking, and
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thus liberating knowledge cannot be an action. The opponent even uses the gradualist
metaphor of wiping clean the mirror to describe the spiritual path, and this metaphor is
rejected by Śaṅkara, because, again, the self, which is identical to brahman, cannot be the
object of any action.51
Śaṅkara distinguishes knowledge of brahman from reasoning and meditation. The
latter he classifies as types of mental action while knowledge, by contrast, depends on the
object known, and not on any human effort:
Meditation (dhyāna) and thinking (cintana) are, indeed, mental in the sense that a
person has the ability to do them, or not to do them, or to do them differently,
because they are dependent on the person. Knowledge (jñāna), however, is
born from a valid means of knowledge (pramān.ajanya), and a valid means of
knowledge takes as its object something that is truly existent. Knowledge is
entirely dependent on the object alone. It is not dependent on a rule. It is not
even dependent on a person. Therefore, even though it is mental, knowledge
differs greatly [from meditation and the like].52
So, for Śaṅkara, the intent of the passage at Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5, which appears to
the opponent to prescribe certain actions, is simply to divert one’s attention away from the
sense objects of the world and towards the self.53 It does not require any action from us. It
simply directs the mind toward inquiry into brahman. It certainly does not provide anything
like a complete map of the spiritual path. Śaṅkara offers the same interpretation again in
the commentary on Brahmasūtra 3.2.21: “Even those scriptural passages such as ‘[the self]
should be seen’ and so on, which speak of the duty to know the highest brahman, have as
their principal purpose to bring one face to face with reality (tattvābhimukhı̄karan.apradhānā)
and not to require that one realize reality.”54 Such passages can only direct one’s attention
to reality. They are prompts, not rules. They literally bring one “face to face” with the
knowledge of brahman, but they cannot cause or enjoin it because such knowledge is not
something one can cause or effect. In fact, we already possess it.
There is obviously a tension here between Śaṅkara’s desire, on the one hand, to
emphasize the effortlessness or passivity (the lack of agency) with which the practitioner
knows the liberating knowledge of reality, and his need on the other hand to provide a
set of instructions or some kind of description of a regular process by means of which
one realizes that one already possesses such knowledge. This tension is present whenever
the subitist attempts to provide instructions while remaining true to the implications of
spontaneously achieving a goal that is thought to be innate.
7. On “Perfect Seeing” and the Sudden/Gradual Dichotomy in the
Brahmasūtra-Bhās.ya
We have seen that Śaṅkara draws a parallel between seeing and knowing, and that he
distinguishes knowledge from meditation. He does so again and again. Another instance
is found in the first explicit reference in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya to the important concept of
“perfect seeing” (samyagdarśana). For Śaṅkara it is tantamount to the liberating knowledge
of brahman, as we have already seen in his commentary on the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad.
The passage is found in the commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.3.13, the context of which is
the assertion that the object of a particular meditation is, in fact, the highest brahman. To
distinguish knowledge from meditation, Śaṅkara notes that meditation can take an unreal
or imaginary thing for its object, whereas knowing, like seeing, requires a real object:
In this case, an act of meditation can also take an unreal thing as its object, as, for
instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But an act of seeing can only take
a real thing as its object, as we know from experience in the world; we therefore
conclude that in the passage last quoted only the highest self, which is the real
object of perfect seeing (samyagdarśana), is indicated as the object of sight.55
Śaṅkara, like Kamalaśı̄la, is sensitive to the concern that one can meditate upon unreal
objects and that meditation can thereby become ineffective or misleading. In responding to
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this concern, Śaṅkara draws upon the conceptual metaphor that KNOWING IS SEEING
in order to distinguish knowledge from meditation. He wants to ensure the reality of the
object of knowledge. However, the conclusion to the commentary on this verse suggests a
kind of gradualism that seems to accept that meditation can play a preparatory role in the
attainment of liberating knowledge:
With reference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is not an
appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest self, we finally remark
that the objection is removed if we understand the passage to refer to liberation
by stages (kramamukti). He who meditates on the highest self by means of the
syllable Aum, consisting of three mātrās, obtains for his reward the world of
Brahma and afterwards gradually “complete seeing” (samyagdarśana).56
Śaṅkara makes a noteworthy concession here. Elsewhere in the Brahmasūtra-bhās.ya, he is
adamant that liberation itself can have no degrees and neither can knowledge of brahman:
“For all the scriptures assert that the state of liberation has only one form. For the state
of liberation is nothing but brahman, and brahman is not connected with different forms
because it has the character of being one.”57 However, Śaṅkara admits that knowledge of
brahman may arise after a longer or shorter period of time, depending on the strength of the
means employed and the qualifications of the individual practitioner. So, here again we
see a manifestation of the tension between immediacy and progression, as well as between
spontaneity and regularity of causation.
These tensions come to the foreground in a short sequence of twelve verses at the
beginning of the fourth and final chapter of the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya.58 In the commentary on 4.1.1, Śaṅkara explains that these twelve verses constitute an “extra discussion”
(vicāraśes.a) of the means of knowledge (sādhana). He then immediately quotes from the
Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5: “Verily, it is the self that should be seen; it is the self that
should be heard; it is the self that should be considered; it is the self on which one should
concentrate.” The question at issue is whether one needs to do these mental practices
“repeatedly” (āvr.tti), or do them “suddenly, immediately, all at once” (sakr.t).59 Interestingly,
Śaṅkara has the opponent argue here that one should do them only once and the authoritative voice then counters that they should be done repeatedly. He further argues that
knowledge and meditation are often used synonymously in the scriptures, and that this
implies repeated practice. The commentary on 4.1.7 even gives a definition of meditation as
“the activity of extending a single train of thought.”60 Throughout these verses, a variety of
different meditations are accepted by Śaṅkara as valid forms of practice for the practitioner
who seeks to know brahman.
Śaṅkara does grant the possibility of a person experiencing liberating knowledge of
brahman from hearing the scriptural passage, “You are that” (tattvamasi), only once. For
those who are “slow-witted” (mandamati), however, and do not have such spontaneous
experience, repetition is useful. Śaṅkara thus introduces another kind of gradualism here
by appealing to the distinction—one might call it a duality—between those who are “slowwitted” and those who are “quick-witted” (nipun.amati). This distinction echoes comments
at the beginning of the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya on the four sādhanas or qualifications for inquiry
into brahman. One must possess (1) the ability to discern (viveka) the difference between
the permanent (i.e., brahman) and the impermanent; (2) dispassion (vairāgya) towards the
fruits of one’s actions; (3) mental quietude (śama), restraint (dama), inwardness (uparati),
patient acceptance (titiks.ā), single-mindedness (samādhanā), and faith (śraddhā); and (4) a
desire for liberation (mumuks.utva). Several of these same qualifications are also found at
the beginning of the prose portion of the Upadeśasāhasrı̄.61
Thus, even if Śaṅkara asserts, as he repeatedly does, that scripture is the only valid
means of knowing reality, and that knowledge is not an action, and that the highest brahman
admits no distinctions, we must nevertheless understand these broader epistemological and
ontological claims within the context of Śaṅkara’s overall path philosophy. The passages
cited above make clear that the knowledge of reality arising from inquiry into brahman is
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dependent on the transformation of the person, and such a transformation implies both
path and goal. The practitioner must be properly prepared for the kind of inquiry Śaṅkara
envisions and enacts in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya itself, and such inquiry occurs within a
specific social context. In the commentary on 4.1.12, the final verse of the short section
on the means (sādhana), he acknowledges once again that some meditations have as their
purpose the attainment of perfect seeing:
The first section of the present chapter has established that one should practice
repetition of all meditations. With respect to those meditations that have “perfect
seeing” (samyagdarśana) as their goal, however, a distinction is made that such
meditations terminate when their effect is accomplished, just as one stops beating
rice when the husks are separated from the grains. For as soon as the effect, that
is, perfect seeing, is attained, no further effort can be enjoined, since scriptural
injunctions do not apply to one who knows brahman, which is not the object of
any injunction, as his own self.62
Śaṅkara states here that some meditation practices have liberating knowledge of brahman
as their goal. He even employs a metaphor of repeated effort to describe the process.
However, he does not say that such practices will actually produce liberating knowledge. It
seems the best we can do is improve the conditions for liberation by removing the obstacles
to knowledge in our minds. We do this primarily through the prerequisites to knowledge,
preparing ourselves for study, thought, and meditation upon the scriptures under the
guidance of the authoritative teacher; but we still cannot thereby bring about our liberation,
since in truth we are already liberated.
Śaṅkara’s subitist impulses, arising perhaps from his nondualist ontology, also sometimes bring ethical implications, as we see in the above passage when he states that nothing
can be required of the liberated person who knows brahman. Such a claim, of course,
must be understood within the context of a path philosophy in which access to liberating
knowledge has certain prerequisites. While one can see the apparent contradiction here,
it is important to bear in mind that misunderstandings often arise when we juxtapose ostensibly contradictory claims without respecting the place of each claim within the overall
system. Here, we are dealing with the difference between what Kellner (2020), following
Siderits, calls “entry” and “exit” rules. For Śaṅkara, however, there is a basic consistency
between them because knowledge of brahman, being innate within us, cannot be caused,
nor can it require anything of us.
8. An Alternative Voice from Early Vedānta: Man.d.anamiśra on the Threefold Scheme
and Using Conceptuality to Attain Knowledge of the Nonconceptual
Śaṅkara probably had in mind Bhartr.prapañca or an interpretive tradition he represented when he made his criticisms of meditation and the threefold scheme in the
Brahmasūtrabhās.ya. It seems that Man.d.anamiśra may have had Śaṅkara’s criticisms in
mind when he defended Bhartr.prapañca’s views in his Brahmasiddhi. Recall that representatives of this alternative tradition upheld the practice of prasaṅkhyāna meditation, which
Śaṅkara appears to criticize in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya and Upadeśasāhasrı̄, and they used the
scriptural passages on the threefold scheme as a justification for the claim that meditation
practice can help one acquire knowledge of brahman. Thus, Man.d.ana’s Brahmasiddhi contains an unambiguous statement that the threefold scheme describes the means by which
one destroys ignorance:
Again, by what means is ignorance ended? It is by the repeated practice of
learning, thinking, and meditation (dhyāna), and by the religious life (brahmacarya)
and so forth, which are the different means (sādhanabheda) stated in the treatises
(śāstras). How? The person who previously practices learning and thinking and
then repeatedly practices meditation on the entire diffusion of differences that is
denied with respect to the self—“It is not this, not this”—such a person, opposed
to seeing difference, clearly causes it to end.63
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Man.d.ana goes on to explain how the practices of learning, thinking, and meditation,
though conceptual, can eliminate both ignorance and conceptuality at the same time,
leaving only the “pure, transparent nature” of self-awareness. Toward the end of the same
passage, he raises the question explicitly: “How can one destroy difference with difference
itself (katham
. bhedenaiva bhedah. pratisam
. hriyate)?” Man.d.ana responds, “because of its being
the antidote of difference, like powder eliminates powder” (yathā rajasā rajah.). He explains
the analogy here by referring to a method by which a powdered substance is introduced
into water dirtied by another substance. The introduction of the powder causes a chemical
reaction whereby both substances are precipitated, leaving the water pure. He then offers
two more analogies:
The repeated practices of learning, thinking, and meditation on brahman, which
is beyond difference, are clearly the antidote to seeing difference, even though
they are connected with ignorance, just like stomach fluid digests fluid and is
itself digested or poison destroys another poison and is itself destroyed.64
Man.d.ana thus addresses the question of how a practice that depends on conceptuality and
duality could give rise to a nondual and nonconceptual experience.
The Brahmasiddhi also contains a citation from Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5, “It is the
self that one should consider; it is the self on which one should concentrate (mantavyo
nididhyāsitavyah.),” which is given in support of the view that repeated practice of meditation, ritual action, and so forth is necessary even after a correct vision of reality has arisen,
because it helps to eliminate any regression toward seeing difference and makes a correct
vision of reality continuous and stable.65 The repetition of meditation and other practices
is necessary, according to Man.d.ana, because:
False appearances (mithyāvabhāsa) persist even for a person who has understood
the true nature of the self from the scriptures, about which there is no doubt,
because of the strength of latent dispositions that have power due to the accumulation of repeated false perceptions from beginningless time . . . Therefore, even
if a vision of reality has arisen from a valid source of knowledge, it is thought
that repetition of the vision of reality serves to overpower or destroy the latent
dispositions made firm by having arisen through the repetition of false views
from beginningless time. Thus it is said, “It is the self that one should consider;
it is the self on which one should concentrate” (mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah.), and
there are the regulations (vidhāna) on the qualifications (sādhana) of mental quietude (śama), restraint (dama), living the religious life (brahmacarya), ritual action
(yajña), and so forth. Otherwise, what is the purpose of teaching them?66
We can see how Man.d.ana understands and interprets the key passage from the Br.hadāran.yakaupanis.ad. He, like Śaṅkara, walks a fine line between enjoining a series of practices and
emphasizing the singular power of the scriptures to reveal the true nature of reality.
Interestingly, the comments above immediately lead to another question, namely, whether
the scriptures can give rise to knowledge of reality only with the support of such methods
as living the religious life. Man.d.ana quickly responds, just as Śaṅkara does, that hearing
the scriptures can by itself give rise to knowledge of reality; the supporting qualifications
are not necessary for acquiring such a vision of the truth. Man.d.ana argues that hearing
the scriptures brings “certitude” (niścaya), but he also admits that one can fall back into
error. Thus, repetition is said to be useful for the purpose of stabilizing the correct vision of
reality and destroying false views.
Kellner (2020, p. 58) writes of Kamalaśı̄la:
On the path to liberation, a perceptual awareness of reality was regarded as
necessary for the particular reason that only this kind of awareness, when preceded by a gradual process of acquiring insight, has the power of removing
the afflictive and epistemic obscurations. Ascertainment by inference alone is
simply not powerful enough to effect this kind of fundamental transformation
of consciousness.
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The problem that the repetition of meditation and other such practices, including
the performance of Vedic ritual, is meant to solve for Man.d.ana is the same problem that,
on Kellner’s reading, motivates Kamalaśı̄la’s arguments for the necessity of cultivating
nonconceptual meditation on the gradual path. We also see here that Man.d.ana makes a
distinction between epistemic certainty and spiritual efficacy similar to the one Kellner
finds in Kamalaśı̄la. More broadly, this example reminds us of the importance of looking
carefully at immediate context: both Kamalaśı̄la and Śaṅkara were involved in debates
within their respective traditions as much as, if not more than, between them.67 Yet, it also
suggests the value of broader comparisons for what Foucault (1998) calls “the history of
thought,” which he describes as distinct from both “the history of ideas” and “the history of
mentalities,” because the history of thought focuses on “problems” or “problematizations.68
9. Different Types of Meditation and the Addition of Nonconceptual Meditation to
the Threefold Scheme in Post-Śaṅkara Vedānta
The nature and purpose of meditation and its relationship to various discursive
practices, such as philosophical reasoning, have been among the central problems raised in
this essay, but of course meditation is a rather vague term. It has various specific names,
types, and definitions, some of which we have already encountered: bhāvanā, nididhyāsana,
dhyāna, upāsana, prasaṅkhyāna, parisaṅkhyāna, and samādhi, not to mention vidyā and jñāna.
Now, it would seem that by the time of Śaṅkara and Man.d.anamiśra (circa 8th century) a
gradual threefold process of learning, reasoning, and “meditation” (nididhyāsana, upāsana,
dhyāna), culminating in the state of “perfect seeing” or liberating knowledge, either had
become or was in the process of becoming an established doctrine in Vedānta. At some
point, a fourth stage, samādhi, “meditative absorption” or “concentration,” was added to
these three practices. For example, Mayeda (1979, p. xv) draws our attention to the much
later example of the Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda (circa 15th or 16th century?), which includes
samādhi after the threefold scheme.69 An earlier example of the threefold scheme being
augmented by a fourth stage involving nonconceptual meditation (nirvikalpasamādhi) is the
Vivekacūd.āman.i, but how much earlier is unclear: the verse text’s attribution to Śaṅkara has
been the subject of ongoing debate.70 In the midst of a striking series of verses (361–365ff)
in which we also find the “gradualist” metaphor of purifying gold,71 we find the following
statement: “The virtue of thinking (manana) should be considered a hundred times greater
than learning (śruti), and meditation (nididhyāsa) has a virtue one hundred thousand times
greater even than thinking, while [the virtue of] nonconceptual meditation (nirvikalpaka) is
limitless.”72 The next verse then clearly states that nonconceptual meditation is the means
by which one comes to know the reality of brahman (brahmatattva).
The addition of this fourth stage called samādhi suggests several things. For one
thing, it points to the general popularity in Indian thought of the idea that meditation
defined somehow is necessary for liberation. Insofar as samādhi here stands primarily for
nirvikalpasamādhi, nonconceptual meditation, the addition of a fourth stage may be seen as
further evidence of the growing popularity of the notion of nonconceptual meditation among
the path systems of classical India at the time. Additionally, and quite significantly, the addition of a fourth stage called samādhi suggests how the earlier Vedānta tradition, including
Śaṅkara and Man.d.anamiśra, understood the concept of nididhyāsana or dhyāna itself. The
tradition could have simply reinterpreted the concept of nididhyāsana to include samādhi
and even nirvikalpasamādhi. The fact that it did not seems to suggest that nididhyāsana was
understood primarily as a conceptual meditative practice, for instance, a practice involving
repeatedly fixing one’s mind upon the “great sayings” (mahāvākyas) of the Upanis.ads, such
as “You are that” (tat tvam asi), which are, of course, discursive and conceptual.
Whether the experience of liberating knowledge to which the conceptual practices of
learning, reasoning, and meditation pave the way was thought to be nonconceptual, and if
so, then how such conceptual practices as these ones could lead to nonconceptual experience: these remain, for me, questions worthy of discussion. In this respect, it would be
interesting to engage in a more detailed comparison of the meditation practices described
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by Śaṅkara and Man.d.anamiśra, particularly the practices of “repetitive contemplation”
(prasaṅkhyāna) and “contemplative rehearsal” (parisaṅkhyāna). In fact, after composing the
musings and questions above in the process of completing the penultimate draft of this
essay, I became aware of Uskokov (2018), which engages in precisely such an investigation. He concludes, in short, that the difference between prasaṅkhyāna and parisaṅkhyāna
meditation is akin to the older distinction between yoga and sāṁkhya, respectively.73 His
analysis makes for compelling reading and could form a solid basis, alongside works like
Kellner (2020) and Adam (2016), for pursuing a broader comparison of these meditation
methods in early Advaita Vedānta with Buddhist conceptions of meditation, such as Kamalaśı̄la’s description of the “contemplation of the real” (bhūtapratyaveks.ā) as a method of
“analytical” (vipaśyanā) meditation, and how all these meditation practices relate to and
emerge from practices of reason in their respective traditions.74 Whether or not they give
nonconceptual meditation or knowledge a prominent place in their path philosophies, it
seems that all three philosophers mentioned above place an emphasis on the conceptual
and discursive nature of meditation practice.
10. Conclusions
Although focused on a common scheme or model of acquiring knowledge, this essay
has highlighted some significant epistemological questions arising from basic differences
in the final ontology of the two philosophical traditions under discussion. Advaita Vedānta
claims that each person possesses an essential nature, the self or ātman, which is both
numerically and qualitatively identical to the essence of all things, brahman. Kamalaśı̄la
denies that self and essence exist. Instead, according to him, everything arises in dependence on other things; that is, everything is selfless, empty of essential nature. While the
philosophers under analysis agree that our ordinary experiences mislead us, they hold
seemingly contradictory positions about the ultimate nature of things. If we apply the
traditional formula, we get four possibilities:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Śaṅkara is right and Kamalaśı̄la is wrong.
Kamalaśı̄la is right and Śaṅkara is wrong.
Both of them are right (in some way).
Both of them are wrong (in some way).

The first and second options most closely parallel traditional polemics. Both Kamalaśı̄la
and Śaṅkara are committed to the truth of their respective positions and the corollary
that its truth entails the falsity of the opposing view. The third option could lead us
down the road toward perennialism, the idea that all religious philosophies ultimately
express the same truth, but we need not take it so far. Perhaps there is something in what
both are saying that could point toward the truth. For example, they seem to agree that
some kind of conscious awareness remains present even in ostensibly nonconceptual or
nondual states of mind. I take this to be the import of Kamalaśı̄la’s characteristic doctrine
75
of “reflexive awareness” (svasam
. vedanā), while for Śaṅkara it is a basic implication of
the conscious nature of brahman. The fourth option opens the door to entirely different
ways of conceptualizing reality. Perhaps both final ontologies overdetermine the empirical
evidence that experimentation can provide. In any case the basic epistemological question
remains: how can one determine the truth of the situation?
Kamalaśı̄la and Śaṅkara appear to agree that meditation will not help one solve
the problem. As “continuity” theorists, both argue that effective and epistemically valid
meditation practice must follow from correct reasoning and correct reasoning follows from
and issues in a correct understanding of scripture, one likely developed in close contact
with a teacher or community of practitioners. Neither would go so far as to accept the
possibility of a scenario in which an experienced practitioner of his tradition, who had
been devoted wholeheartedly to its teachings and practices, might discover on the basis of
advanced meditation experience that his own tradition is wrong and the rival’s tradition is
right.76 Each philosopher is committed to a particular body of knowledge that he seeks to
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defend. Yet, the continuity thesis gives rise to a challenging epistemological question: if the
truths accessible through meditation merely conform to those already available through
learning and reasoning, how do we know that we are not simply fooling ourselves into
believing that our meditation practice gives us access to the truth? In other words, how
do we overcome the problem of “autosuggestion” or even “confirmation bias” in our
meditation practice?77
For Śaṅkara, the answer to this question could be as simple as saying that scripture
tells us the truth. It has intrinsic validity. Scripture removes ignorance, whereas knowledge is not an action. The concern with autosuggestion arises only from the perspective
of a skeptical application of reason detached from belief in scripture. Such skepticism
generates an infinite regress whereby no knowledge can ever be validated. According to
Tillemans (2016, p. 191), Kamalaśı̄la’s answer is to say that meditation must be validated
by reasoning, but one wonders whether this answer entirely solves the problem and if
Tillemans has adequately represented his position. Kamalaśı̄la deserves further attention
on this question. Does not valid reasoning for a Buddhist philosopher like him also require
some foundation in empirical investigation in order to grant access to the truth? On the
other hand, when Kamalaśı̄la speaks about the nature of reality, he relies heavily on the
authority of scripture, the Buddha’s words. It is commonly said that for Buddhist philosophy the validity of the Buddhist scriptures derives from the Buddha’s own personal
experimentation, his own direct insight into the nature of reality after having rejected
alternatives. That is fair. The traditional narratives of the Buddha’s attainment of liberating
knowledge do not characterize him as accepting one among existing alternatives. Instead,
he rejects all of them, forges his own path to the truth, and subsequently establishes his
own institution. The situation is quite different with Kamalaśı̄la and Śaṅkara, however.
Both are defenders of established institutions as well as rationalist philosophers working
from within centuries-old traditions. Most traditional Indian narratives of religious conversion likewise feature philosophical debate or the performance of wonder-working or
both, contests waged between already well-established positions.78 That said, it would be
valuable to explore classical Indian narrative literature to see if there are any traditional
stories of religious conversion or liberation that lend support for an independence theory,
and if so, how.
Independence theorists face some equally challenging epistemological questions of
their own. For example, if the independence theorist argues for the unique epistemic
value of nonconceptual meditation, a mental state in which all discursivity or conceptual
thought has stopped, then how could nonconceptual meditation provide any information
at all? We have not dealt with actual independence theories in this essay, but it would be
valuable to do so.79 If we grant for the sake of argument that something like nonconceptual
experience is possible, then it stands to reason that nonconceptual meditation must be
available to conceptualization in something like the same way that, for Kamalaśı̄la and
Śaṅkara, conceptual or theoretical knowledge can give rise to and become available for
nonconceptual experience. Beyond that, we might ask whether the independence theorist,
as someone who appears committed to the claim that all conceptual constructions distort
reality, would find any value in working out a theory of epistemic independence at all.
I began this essay with the observation that epistemological or philosophical questions,
as Foucault defines them, do not go away simply by decentering the concern with truth
in order to focus on the transformative techniques of traditional path philosophies. We
have seen that Śaṅkara and Kamalaśı̄la were deeply concerned with questions of truth and
falsehood. We have also seen how this concern motivates some of their uses and critiques
of the threefold scheme. I want to conclude by emphasizing once again the importance
of understanding their engagement with epistemological questions within the broader
context of their spiritual path philosophies. We are not dealing here with detached speculations on the nature of reality but with committed articulations of particular strategies
of self-transformation. Śaṅkara and Kamalaśı̄la were equally, if not more, concerned with
techniques of “spiritual” efficacy. This does not mean they were “pragmatists” concerned
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only with what works, or that they upheld a pragmatic theory of truth, but that they saw
epistemology, ontology, and path philosophy as mutually implicating areas of concern. It
remains an open question, at least for me, how best to compare their situation with the
one in which we find ourselves today. Although many people in modern times have run
from truth, albeit in several different directions, the framework of the threefold scheme
and the conceptual metaphor of liberating knowledge as a form of perception point to a
concern some still share with understanding the nature of knowledge, the process whereby
a person comes into relationship with knowledge, and the effect of knowledge upon the
knowing individual. Such a concern brings us face to face with the aporias of truth and
self-transformation: why must we transform ourselves to access a truth we possess innately? On the other hand, if we do not already possess a certain knowledge, how could
we acquire it without ourselves being changed in some way? We cannot easily disentangle
epistemological questions from problems of path philosophy.
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Notes
1

Foucault (2001, p. 16). My translation. See also Collins (2020, pp. xxxi–ii).

2

Pierre Hadot had reached a somewhat similar conclusion, although he developed a reading of Aristotle that emphasized theory
as a form of practice. See, for instance, Hadot (2002), especially chapter six, and the comments of Kapstein (2001, p. 9).

3

Foucault uses the term “spiritual technique” in the 1978 interview published as “The Theatre of Philosophy” (La scène de la
philosophie) on which see Collins (2020, pp. 89–90). As is now well-known, Foucault developed his notion of “technologies of self”
in dialogue with the work of Pierre Hadot and his notion of “spiritual exercises” (exercices spirituels). On the use of Hadot (and
Foucault) in exercises of comparison with Buddhism and non-western traditions, see Collins (2020) as well as the essays collected
in Fiordalis (2018a) and the references therein.
On Foucault’s skepticism, see the passing remark of Collins (2020, p. xxxv).

4
5

6

Fiordalis (2018b) looks at the use of the threefold scheme in Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (circa 4th century) and argues that the
“continuity” thesis also gives us an accurate description of Vasubandhu’s position on the relationship between reasoning and
meditation.
Gómez (2015, pp. 1125–26). The above is Gómez’s translation. The concept of “all-knowledge” or “omniscience” (sarvajñā)
indicates the goal of the path. For more on this concept in the works of Kamalaśı̄la, see McClintock (2010).

7

Gómez (1987, pp. 77–78), italics in the original. The translation of Huineng’s poem is also from Gómez (1987, p. 73).

8

A great deal has been written on the so-called Samye (bSam yas) debate. In the introduction to his edition of the first Bhāvanākrama,
Tucci ([1956–1958] 1986, pp. 316, 348–51, 393) discusses some of the Tibetan sources that link the composition of the three
Bhāvanākrama treatises to a formal debate. On the nature of the debate itself and whether it was actually a series of written
correspondences, see the secondary sources by Demiéville and Ueyama cited in Kellner (2020, p. 41), footnote 5. See also
Higgins (2016) for a bibliography of other relevant studies.

9

In this respect, we could also consider the materials selected and studied in Gómez (1983a).

10

For evidence, Adam cites Balagangadhara (2005, p. 105ff), which actually makes only a somewhat cursory reference to the
threefold scheme, but Adam also cites an unpublished masters thesis by Christine Fillion from McGill University on the threefold
scheme in Śaṅkara’s Upadeśasāhasrı̄. On that basis he refers to the two passages in the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad that will concern us
in this article, especially when we look at the threefold scheme in Śaṅkara and early Vedānta. Kapstein (2001, p. 25), footnote
29, also includes a brief reference to the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad and notes the similarity of its progression with the Buddhist
scheme. By contrast, no mention is made of this broader non-Buddhist context in Eltschinger (2010), an excellent article focused
on the development in Buddhist thought of the concept of wisdom arising from reasoning and a commonly cited source on the
threefold scheme. Fiordalis (2018b, p. 255) makes only a passing reference to Adam (2006) and Balagangadhara (2005).

11

Rambachan (1991) gives many concrete examples in the introductory chapter of his work from which it becomes abundantly
clear that the threefold scheme is well-known in Indian religious philosophy from its presence in the Vedānta tradition. A casual,
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if well-informed, search of the internet reveals the same thing. Ramana Maharshi would be an interesting modern figure to
consider, but there is no space to do so in this article.
12

Scholars debate the dating of and historical relationships among these important early Vedānta figures, but we can be reasonably
certain that Gaud.apāda and Bhartr.prapañca preceded Śaṅkara and Man.d.anamiśra, who may have been contemporaries. On
the vexed figure of Gaud.apāda, see Potter (1981, pp. 103–5). On Bhartr.prapañca, who wrote a now lost commentary on
the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad, see Hiriyanna (1957, pp. 79–94) and more recently Andrijanić (2015) and Uskokov (2018). On
Man.d.anamiśra and the question of his relationship to Śaṅkara, see Thrasher (1979) and Tola (1989). See Harimoto (2006) for
a discussion of the dating of Śaṅkara. On the apparent influence of Buddhism on Śaṅkara (and Gaud.apāda) see, for instance,
Whaling (1979), which also discusses the view that Śaṅkara introduced into the Hindu tradition a monastic organizational
structure on par with and influenced by Buddhist monasticism. Regarding Bhartr.prapañca and Man.d.anamiśra, it seems clear
that they were influenced by the Yoga tradition, and if so, then they were also influenced by Buddhism, albeit indirectly, as
Buddhism probably had a strong influence on development of the Yoga tradition.

13

Foucault apparently misidentifies the relevant chapter from Epictetus’ Dialogues, but the editor points the reader toward book 1,
chapter 4, “Of progress or improvement.” For a translation, see Long (1890, pp. 13–17). There is also a question about the Greek
terminology. In his French translation of Plato’s Republic, Leroux (2002, p. 585), note 128, comments on a passage from Book III,
section 407b–d: “Plato distinguishes here between study (mathēsis), activities of reflection (ennoēseis), and concentration on oneself
(melétas pròs heautòn) . . . this list puts us in the presence of the three registers of philosophical exercise . . . ” My translation of the
French. In their English translation of the relevant passage from the Republic, Grube and Reeve give “ . . . learning, thought, or
private meditation . . . ” (Cooper 1997, p. 1043). At issue is the distinction between the practices of “thinking” or “reflection”
(ennoēseis) and “concentration” or “meditation” (meletē), and the conceptual question of whether meletē and indeed all these
practices should be classified as types of askēsis or not. A note of thanks to Marc-Henri Deroche for drawing my attention to this
noteworthy passage from the Republic.

14

I became aware of Aleksandar Uskokov’s dissertation, Uskokov (2018), only at the final stage of revising this article for publication,
thanks to a comment from one of the anonymous reviewers for the journal. Uskokov’s work includes a thorough discussion of
the threefold scheme in Śaṅkara and early Advaita Vedānta and explores a number of questions raised in this article. In fact, it is
precisely the recent study I wish I had known earlier because it would have made my research easier and allowed me to do more
with this article. Rather than revising my entire article in light of his research, however, I have chosen to keep it intact, making
only a few references to his dissertation here and there, and I would encourage interested readers to consult it and compare
our interpretations.

15

Demiéville (1987, p. 16), noting Deussen (1912, p. 403).

16

The terms “passivism” and “passivity” will be used here to refer primarily to the distinction Śaṅkara draws between knowledge
as a state of passive receptivity and a more “active” sense of acquiring knowledge or liberation. It is thus distinct from “quietism,”
at least as Tillemans (2016, p. 3) defines the term: “reasoned disengagement from all philosophical theses and hence debates
(vivāda) about them.” Gómez (1987, p. 128) notes that Zaehner considered Śaṅkara a “quietist,” but I leave open the question
of whether Śaṅkara’s position has any similarities with the “quietism” of the Spanish mystic, Miguel de Molinos, and other
Christian “quietists.” We should bear in mind that “quietism” and “passivism” (as distinct from “pacifism”) have been given
various pejorative connotations which should not be imported unconsciously into this context but considered critically alongside
the positions described here and below.

17

Gómez refers to the well-known classifications found in Potter (1963).
Gómez (1983a, 1983b, 1987) is exemplary in this respect.

18
19

Foucault (2001, p. 17). My translation.

20

See the clear statement by Śaṅkara in the commentary on the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad cited and translated by Rambachan (1991,
pp. 66–67). Consider also Uskokov (2018, p. 441ff), and chapter seven, on the key role played by the desire for liberation in this
path system.

21

This conceptual metaphor is identified and discussed in Lakoff and Johnson (1980, pp. 48, 103–5). See also Lakoff and Turner
(1989, pp. 48, 158, 190–91, 206). Following them, I capitalize key metaphors for the sake of clarity and emphasis. KNOWING IS
SEEING seems related to, but distinct from, the conceptual metaphor, SEEING IS BELIEVING, which is only half of a quote from
the 17th-century English clergyman, Thomas Fuller: “Seeing’s believing, but feeling’s the truth.” There is clearly a productive
tension to be considered further between seeing as belief and seeing as knowledge, both in general and in the history of Indian
thought. In this respect and others, it would be useful to consider Bouthillette (2020) more fully than I have been able to do in
this article.
Foucault (2001, p. 18). My translation.

22
23

24

For an overview of the influential Mı̄mām
. sā philosopher, Kumārila’s position on the differing epistemic values of scripture and
meditation (or yogic perception), see McCrea (2009). On the special contribution of Śaṅkara to the Vedānta tradition, consider
Uskokov (2018).
Few specialists today seem to feel these conditions are sufficient for describing knowledge, but most still agree that they are
either necessary for or even largely constitutive of knowledge. For a lucid discussion, see Ichikawa and Steup (2018).
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25

Tillemans (2016, p. 191). Italics in original.

26

Tucci (1958, p. 198): tatra prathamam
. tāvat śrutamayı̄ prajñotpādanı̄yā | tayā hi tāvad āgamārtham avadhārayati | tataś cintāmayyā
prajñayā nı̄taneyārtham
{Ms:
nı̄taneyārthatayā}
nirvedhayati | tatas tayā niścitya bhūtam artham
.
. bhāvayen nābhūtam | anyathā hi
viparı̄tasyāpi bhāvanād vicikitsāyāś cāvyapagamāt samyagjñānodayo na syāt | tataś ca vyarthaiva bhāvanā syāt | yathā tı̄rthikānām |
uktam
. ca bhagavatā samādhirāje | nairātmyadharmān yadi pratyaveks.ate | tān pratyaveks.ya yadi bhāvayeta | sa hetur nirvān.aphalasya
prāptaye | yo anyahetu na sa bhoti śāntaye | iti | tasmāc cintāmayyā prajñayā yuktyāgamābhyām
. pratyaveks.ya bhūtam eva vastusvarūpam
bhāvanı̄yam | vastūnām
. svarūpam
. ca paramārthato ’nutpāda evāgamato yuktitaś ca niścitam. The translation above is my own, but the
passage is also cited and mostly translated in Kellner (2020, pp. 55–56), and I have benefitted from her reading and translation as
well as that of Adam (2002, p. 128). Another translation is found in Beyer (1974, pp. 104–5).

27

Kellner (2020) explores Kamalaśı̄la’s answer to this question in more detail.

28

Śaṅkara (1964, p. 770): sarvathāpi tu yathā āgamenāvadhāritam
. tarkatastathaiva mantavyam | yathā tarkato matam
. tasya tarkāgamābhyām
.
niścitasya tathaiva nididhyāsanam
kriyata
iti
pr
tha
ṅnididhyāsanavidhiranarthaka
eva.
The
editor’s
name
is
not
provided
in my copy of
.
.
this edition. This edition and indeed the editions of all the Vedānta works cited in this article can be compared with the online
editions of these texts available on the Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages (GRETIL). All the translations
from Sanskrit here and below are my own unless otherwise noted.

29

See Mayeda (1979, p. xv), note 8. In the introduction to his Sanskrit edition of the Upadeśasāhasrı̄, Mayeda (1973, pp. 66–67) makes
the same suggestion while discussing the formation of the text: that the content of the three chapters of the prose part appears to
illustrate “respectively the stage of hearing (śravan.a), the stage of thinking (manana), and the stage of meditation (nididhyāsana),
which constitute the three Vedāntic stages to attainment of final release (moks.a).” Again, citing the same pages from Hacker (1949),
Mayeda concludes that the prose part “constitutes the whole which is complete both in content and in form,” and that “the three
prakaran.as of the Prose Part were written at one time after the composition of at least the 15th prakaran.a of the Metrical Part,” and
“that the three prakaran.as originally constituted a work independent of the Metrical Part.” Mayeda describes the prose text as “a
handy ‘Guide’ for teachers while the Metrical Part is, at it were, a ‘Text Book’ for students.”

30

Uskokov (2018) further demonstrates that Bhartr.prapañca (circa mid 6th century) also supported prasaṅkhyāna meditation, and
that the practice likely had its origins in the yoga tradition. See especially chapter five of his dissertation, which explores the
topic in detail. Therein Uskokov (2018, p. 236) describes Bhartr.prapañca as being “along with Kumārila, Śaṅkara’s main foil,”
which suggests the significant influence he had on Śaṅkara’s thinking.

31

See Mayeda (1979, p. xv), note 7. Rambachan (1991, pp. 1–14), especially 10ff, offers a useful survey of views; in chapter five,
Rambachan (1991, pp. 97–116) goes into a more detailed analysis of the threefold scheme and attempts to reconcile it with his
previous arguments about Śaṅkara’s epistemology and soteriology. See also Uskokov (2018) for a thorough treatment.

32

For the Sanskrit of the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad itself, I have mainly followed the edition in Olivelle (1998, p. 66ff).

33

This concept seems key in Śaṅkara’s thought. We will look at its presence in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya more below. The first
occurrence of the term therein is found in the commentary on 1.3.13, a translation of which is found below, but for the whole
passage one can also look at Thibaut (1890, p. 172) and also consider his footnote 2.

34

That is, the mind becomes settled down or calm and therefore clear, like pure, still water. This state of mental clarity would seem
to be the precondition for experiencing oneness with brahman. The verb used here is related to the Buddhist concept of prasāda,
“faith or trust.”
Śaṅkara (1964, p. 760): tasmād ātmā vai are dras..tavyo darśanārho darśanavis.ayamāpādayitavah. | śrotavyah. pūrvamācāryata āgamataśca |
paścānmantavyastarkatah. | tato nididhyāsitavyo niścayena dhyātavyah. | evam
. hyasau dr.s..to bhavati śravan.amanananididhyāsana-sādhanair
nirvartitaih. | yadaikatvametānyupagatāni tadā samyagdarśanam
brahmaikatvavis
.
. ayam
. prası̄dati nānyathā śravan.amātrena.

35

36

Nididhyāsana must derive from ni-dhyai, which puts it in the same etymological stemma as dhyāna, which also derives from
dhyai. Another key term for meditation in the writings of Śaṅkara, that is, in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya and his commentaries
on the Upanis.ads, is upāsana. Samādhi is not commonly used therein. According to Comans (1993, pp. 23–24), it is found
only three times in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya and never prominently as a feature of the authoritative (siddhānta) viewpoint. For
instance, in Brahmasūtra 2.3.39 and commentary it is found in close proximity to a reference to Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad 2.4.5,
but the commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.3.40 makes it clear that these verses are considered by Śaṅkara to be arguments of an
opposing viewpoint.

37

Rambachan (1991, p. 157), note 62, sees this change as significant, perhaps as a basis for arguing that nididhyāsana can be seen
as equivalent to knowledge and thus distinct from meditation. Rambachan also prefers “contemplation” to meditation as a
translation for nididhyāsana. However, the work of Uskokov (2018, pp. 191, 204ff), especially chapter three, suggests to me a
different possibility, as he argues for the general equivalency of knowledge (vidyā) and meditation (upāsana) in the doctrine of the
Upanis.ads and in early Vedānta, that is, in Bādarāyan.a’s Brahma-sūtra itself, and for the importance of meditation as the primary
means to liberation therein.
For the first claim, see, for example, the comment on Brahmasūtra 2.1.3: “Knowledge of reality, however, arises only from
the Vedānta texts alone” (tattvajñānam
. tu vedāntavākyebhya eva bhavati). Rambachan (1991, pp. 46, 140), note 89, also cites
this passage. On the second claim that hearing scripture can produce immediate knowledge of brahman, see particularly

38
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Comans (2000, pp. 300–3), where he cites and discusses Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brahmasūtra 4.1.2 and the Upadeśasāhasrı̄,
chapter 18, verses 104 and 192; see also the discussion in Comans (1996).
39

Part 1, chapter 17, verse 66. The translation is from Mayeda (1979, p. 166). Following Mayeda (1973, p. 141), the Sanskrit reads:
bhārūpatvād yathā bhānor nāhorātre tathaiva tu | jñānājñāne na me syātām
. cidrūpatvāviśes.atah..

40

Śaṅkara (1964, p. 760): yadbrahmaks.atrādi karmanimittam
. varn.āśramādilaks.an.am
. ātmany avidyādhyāropita-pratyayavis.ayam
. kriyākāraka
phalātmakam
avidyāpratyayavis
ayam
rajjvām
iva
sarpapratyayah
tadupamardanārtha
āha—ātmani
khalv
are
maitreyi
dr
s
.
.
.
.
. . .te śrute mate
vijñāte idam
sarvam
viditam
vijñātam
bhavati.
The
comment
here
also
suggests
that
Śa
ṅkara
reads
the
second
sentence
of the
.
.
.
.
scriptural passage in the same way it appears at 4.5.6.

41

Śaṅkara (1964, p. 941): ātmani khalv are maitreyi dr.s..te | katham
. dr.s..ta ātmanı̄ti ucyate—pūrvam ācāryāgamābhyām
. śrute punas
tarken.opapattayā mate vicārite | śravan.am
. tvāgamamātren.a mata upapattyā paścādvijñāta evametan nānyatheti nirdhārite | kim
. bhavatı̄ty
ucyata idam
viditam
bhavati
|
idam
sarvam
iti
yadātmano
’nyat
|
ātmavyatireken
ābhāvāt.
The
final
sentence
of
the
received
scriptural
.
.
.
.
passage differs here slightly from the previous passage at 2.4.5. The second sentence of 4.5.6 reads as follows: “For, oh Maitreyı̄,
when the self is seen (dr.s..te), heard (śrute), considered (mate), and known (vijñāte), all this is known.” This reading coincides with
the passage as quoted in the final sentence of Śaṅkara’s commentary on 2.4.5.

42

The discussion that follows can be usefully compared with chapter nine of Uskokov (2018, p. 438ff). For one thing, he offers therein
an interpretation of the three prose chapters of the Upadeśasāhasrı̄ from the perspective of the threefold scheme (pp. 459–77).

43

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, pp. 88–89): vākyārthavicāran.ādhyavasānanirvr.ttā hi brahmāvagatih. nānumānādipramān.āntaranirvr.ttā . . . śrutyaiva ca
sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt | tathāhi ‘śrotavyo mantavyah.’ iti śrutih. . . . purus.abuddhisāhāyyam ātmāno darśayati.

44

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, p. 89): na dharmajijñāsāyāmiva śrutyādaya eva pramān.am
. brahmajijñāsāyām kim
. tu śrutyādayo ’nubhavādayaśca yathāsam
.b
havamiha pramān.am
. anubhavāvasānatvādbhūtavastuvis.ayatvācca brahmajñānasya. Rambachan (1991, pp. 113–15) discusses this key
passage; so does Comans (2000, p. 308); so does Uskokov (2018, p. 447ff).

45

The word nirvikalpa does not appear at all in the commentary on the Br.hadāran.yaka-upanis.ad, and as Comans (1993) points out,
the word samādhi is virtually absent from the ten principal upanis.ads. However, although the word nirvikalpa appears only three
times in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya and never in connection with samādhi or jñāna, Śaṅkara does use it as an adjective describing
brahman, where it seems synonymous with the terms abheda, “nondual,” and nirviśes.a, “without description.” See the commentary
on 3.2.11–12 and 3.2.21. We find there the statement, “brahman is free from conceptualization” (nirvikalpam eva brahma).

46

In the present context, Rambachan (1991, p. 155), note 42, includes the comment: “The mental modification which destroys
avidyā is sometimes conceived as a final thought or vr.tti, the crystallization of brahmajñāna. As such it is termed as brahmākāravr.tti
(a thought coinciding with the nature of brahman) or akhandākāra cittavr.tti (a mental modification centered on nonduality).”
However, I cannot find these latter terms used in the Brahmasūtrabhās.ya or Br.hadāran.yakopanis.ad-bhās.ya. They may be later
Vedānta technical terms.
Consider also in this same light the evocative language used by Uskokov (2018, p. 522) in the final few paragraphs of his
dissertation, beginning with the following comment: “While the pursuit of liberation had to terminate in personal experience, this
‘intuitus’ or ‘dawning of insight’ or ‘vision’ precisely had to be reasoned out, by means of the two forms of reasoning, theological or
scriptural exegesis (śravan.a) and philosophical reflection (manana) based on analogy (sāmānyato-dr.s..ta) . . . ” Italics in original.

47

48

One may note besides that Kamalaśı̄la also speaks of “making the true nature of reality perceptible” (pratyaks.ı̄-kr.), using similar
terminology to Śaṅkara, but he speaks of meditation as the mechanism by which one does so. See Adam (2016, p. 364), for the
relevant passage from the first Bhāvanākrama.

49

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, p. 818): pratyaks.aphalatvācca jñānasya phalavirahāśaṅkānupapattih. | karmaphale hi svargādav anubhānārūd.he syādāśaṅkā
bhāved vā na veti | anubhavārūd.ham
. tu jñānaphalam ’yatsāks.ādaparoks.abrahma’ iti śruteh. ‘tattvamasi’ iti siddhivadupadeśāt | na hi
‘tattvamasi’ ityasya vākyasyārthas tattvam mr.to bhavis.yası̄ty evam
. parin.etum
. sakyah. | ‘taddhaitatpaśyannr.s.ir vāmadevah. pratipede ’ham
manurabham
. sūryaśca iti ca samyagdarśanakālam eva tatphalam
. sarvātmatvam
. darśayati. Comans (2000, p. 309) translates and discusses
the same passage above. See also the commentary on Brahmasūtra 3.4.15, which is also mentioned by Comans.

50

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, p. 113): ‘śrotravyo mantavyo nididhyāsitvayah.’ iti ca śravan.ottarakālayor manananididhyāsanayor vidhidarśanāt. See the
alternate translation in Thibaut (1890, p. 26).

51

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, pp. 126–28). See the translation in Thibaut (1890, pp. 28–29, 33–34). See also Rambachan (1991, pp. 59–60), where the
relevant passage is translated as well.

52

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, p. 129): dhyānam cintanam
. yadyapi mānasam
. tathāpi purus.en.a kartumakartumanyathā vā kartum
. sakyam
. purus.atantratvāt
jñānam
tu
pramān
ajanyam
|
pramān
am
ca
yathābhūtavastuvis
ayam
|
kevalam
vastutantrameva
tat
|
na
codanātantram
|
nāpi
purus.atantram
.
.
. .
.
.
| tasmān mānasatve ’pi jñānasya mahadvailaks.an.yam. Alternate translation in Thibaut (1890, p. 35).

53

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, pp. 129–30): kimarthāni tarhi ‘ātmā vā are dras..tavyah. śrotavyah.’ ityādı̄ni vidhicchāyāni vacanāni? Svābhāvika-pravr.ttivis.ayavi
mukhı̄karan.ārthānı̄ti brumah.. Alternate translation in Thibaut (1890, p. 35), and see also Thibaut (1890, pp. 36–44) for the
continuation of the discussion, which includes a series of statements that refer to the three practices and argue again for the
priority of scripture over reasoning and meditation, up to the end of the long commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.1.4.

54

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, pp. 713–14): dras..tavyādisabdā api paravidyādhikārapat.hitāstattvābhimukhı̄karan.apradhānā na tattvāvabodhividhi-pradhānā
bhavanti. See Thibaut (1896, p. 164).
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55

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, pp. 287–88): tatrābhidhyāyateratathābhūtamapi vastu karma bhavati; manorathakalpitasyāpy abhidhyāyatikarmatvāt |
ı̄ks.atestu tathābhūtameva vastu loke karma dr.s..tamityatah. paramātmaivāyam
. samyagdarśanavis.ayabhūta ı̄ks.atikarmatvena vyapadis..ta iti
gamyate.

56

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, p. 289): atha yaduktam
. – paramātmābhidhyāyino na deśaparicchinnaphalam
. yujyata iti | atrocyate—trimātren.om
. kāren.ālambanena
paramātmānamabhidhyāyatah. phalam
brahmalokaprāptih
,
kramen
a
ca
samyagdarśanotpattiriti
kramamuktyabhiprāyametadbhavis
.
.
.
. yatı̄tyados.ah..

57

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, p. 926): muktyavasthā hi sarvavedāntavākes.v ekarūpaivāvadhāryate | brahmaiva hi muktyavasthā na ca brahman.o
’nekākārayogo ’sti ekaliṅgatvāvadhāran.āt.

58

Uskokov (2018, pp. 185–87, 197–207, 443) has an illuminating discussion of this section of the Brahmasūtra.

59

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, pp. 928–29): ‘ātmā vā are dras..tavyah. śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah. . . . ’ iti caivamādiśravan.es.u saṁśayah. – kim
.
sakr.tpratyayah. kartavyah. āhosvidāvr.ttyeti.

60

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, p. 949): upāsanam
. nāma samānapratyayapravāhakaran.am
..
See Śaṅkara’s comments on Brahmasūtra 1.1.1 and Rambachan (1991, p. 87ff). See also the beginning of the prose portion of the
Upadeśasāhasrı̄ in Mayeda (1979).

61

62

Śās.tr.ı̄ (1938, pp. 950–51): āvr.ttih. sarvopāsanes.vādartavyeti sthitamādhye ‘dhikaran.e | tatra yāni tāvatsamyagdarśanārthāny upāsanāni
tānyavaghātādivatkāryaparyavasānānı̄ti jñātamevais.āmāvr.ttiparin.am | na hi samyagdarśane kārye nis.panne yatnāntaram
. kim
. cicchāsitum
.
sakyam; aniyojyabrahmātmatvapratipatteh. śāstrasyāvis.ayatvāt.

63

Śāstrı̄ ([1937] 1984, p. 12): kena punarupāyenāvidyā nivartate? Śravan.amananadhyānābhyāsair brahmacaryādibhiśca sādhanabhedaih
śāstroktaih. | katham? Yo ’yam śravan.amananapūrvako dhyānābhyāsah. pratis.iddhākhilabhedaprapañce “sa es.a neti neti” ātmani, sa vyaktam
eva bhedadarśanapratiyogı̄ tannivartayati.

64

Śāstrı̄ ([1937] 1984, pp. 12–13): vyaktameva bhedātı̄tabrahman.i śravan.amananadhyānābhyāsānām
. bhedadarśanapratipaks.atvam avidyānubandhe
’pi | yathā payah. payo jarayati svayam
. ca jı̄ryati, yathā ca vis.am
. vis.āntaram
. śamayati svayam
. ca śāmyati. See also the brief summary in
Potter (1981, pp. 353–54).

65

Śāstrı̄ ([1937] 1984, p. 35); Potter (1981, p. 370). The Brahmasiddhi contains three more citations of the word nididhyāsitavyah.,
including one that reads dras..tavyah. śrotavyo nididhyāsitavyah.. See Śāstrı̄ ([1937] 1984, pp. 153–55).

66

Śāstrı̄ ([1937] 1984, p. 35): nirvicikitsādāmnāyād avagatātmatattvasyānādimithyādarśanābhyāsopacitabalavatsam
. skārasāmar thyān
mithyāvabhāsānuvr.ttih.... tasmājjāte ’pi pramān.āttattvadarśane anādimithyādarśanābhyāsaparinis.pannasya drad.hı̄yasah. sam
. skārasyāb
hibhavāyocchedāya vā tattvadarśanābhyāsam
. manyante | tathā ca ‘mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah.’ ityucyate | śamadamabrahmacaryayajñādisād
hanavidhānam ca | anyathā kastad upadeśārthah.? See also Comans (2000, p. 383) and Comans (1996, p. 50), where the early part of
the passage is translated at somewhat greater length, but not the latter part. For the French translation of the whole passage, see
Biardeau (1969, p. 186).

67

Ingalls (1952, p. 13), quoted in Uskokov (2018, p. 9), reminds us that Śaṅkara’s “novelty and original synthesis” were “directed
not so much against Buddhism, which is the traditional claim, as against the Mı̄māṁsā and against schools of a more realistic
Vedānta such as the Bhedābheda which flourished in Śam
. kara’s time.” See also Uskokov (2018, p. 4) for a similar statement.

68

For the full passage by Foucault with an insightful analysis that explains its application to comparative studies like the present
article, see Charles Hallisey’s afterword in Collins (2020, pp. 197–98).

69

See verses 19 and 181ff in Nikhilananda (1931), which is an edition and translation of the Vedāntasāra. Verse 19 says only “learning,
etc.” (śravan.ādi) but verse 181 gives the list of four practices as follows: śravan.a, manana, nididhyāsana, and samādhi. These four
terms are defined in the verses that follow. For instance, in verses 191ff, Sadānanda attempts to distinguish between “reflection”
(manana), “meditation” (nididhyāsana), and “absorption with or without conceptualization” (savikalpa- or nirvikalpa-samādhi).

70

See Potter (1981, p. 335); see also Grimes (2004, pp. 13–14). Uskokov (2018, p. 16), note 23, concludes on the basis of terminology
that it is later than Śaṅkara, but he does not say how much later.

71

On this metaphor in a Buddhist context see Gómez (1987), which focuses on it in detail.

72

Madhavananda (1921, p.161); Grimes (2004, p. 209): śruteh. śatagun.am
. vidyānmananam
. mananādapi | nididhyāsam
. laks.agun.am
anantam
nirvikalpakam.
The
verse
is
numbered
364
in
the
former
and
365
in
the
latter.
.

73

See Uskokov (2018, p. 480) for a clear statement to this effect. He also demonstrates the strong influence of the Yoga tradition
upon the development of prasaṅkhyāna, and shows how the roots of parisaṅkhyāna can be found not only in the Mı̄māṁsā
tradition but also in the Mahābhārata. The story he tells is of the centrality of meditation in the Upanis.ads, the Brahma-sūtra, and
pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta, and for its recovery as a central practice in the work of Vācaspatimiśra (circa 9–10th century), who
was responsible for synthesizing the philosophies of Śaṅkara and Man.d.anamiśra. The window for Śaṅkara’s rationalism appears
narrow indeed.
It would also be interesting to consider further the place of the threefold scheme in the Yoga tradition, more broadly, and how
Yoga path philosophers account for the shift from conceptual practices to nonconceptual meditation. Note, for instance, that the
Yogasūtra, book 1, verses 48–50, mentions the concept of “truth-bearing wisdom” (r.tambharā prajñā), which seemingly arises from
a type of samādhi, and contrasts it with wisdom that derives from learning (śruta) and inference (anumāna).

74

75

For a brief discussion of this concept, see Kellner (2020, pp. 65–67). For fuller treatments, see Williams (1998) and Arnold (2010).
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76

See Adam (2016, p. 372), note 37, for his take on Kamalaśı̄la’s position here.

77

This concern is raised in Tillemans (2013, 2016).
For an overview of Buddhist debate narratives, see Cabezón (2008, pp. 71–92).

78
79
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Tillemans (2016, pp. 193–94) identifies the 14th-century Tibetan Buddhist philosopher, Longchenpa (Klong chen Rab ’byams pa),
as a good candidate, and indeed a comparison between him and Śaṅkara could be fruitful. In the process, it may be that the
distinction between “continuity” and “independence” theses will need to be rethought along with, of course, the one between
“subitism” and “gradualism.”
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